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ALL PARTIES
[47 C.Zd 597; 306 P.2d 824]
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In Bank. .Jan. 24, 1957.]

THE IVANHOE IRRIGATION DISTRICT, Plaintiff and
Appellant, v. ALL PARTIES AND PERSONS, etc.,
Defendants; COURTNEY McCRACKEN et al., Respondents; THE PEOPLE, Defendant and Appellant.
[1] Waters-Irrigation Districts-Confirmation Proceedings.-A
proceeding by an irrigation district to obtain confirmation of
a contract entered into with the United States under the
Irrigation District Federal Cooperation Law (Wat. Code,
§ 23175 et seq.), by which the United States undertook to
deliver water from the Central Valley Project to the district
and to expend funds for construction of a distribution system
within the district, is a special proceeding in rem brought
against all persons having or claiming an interest in the formation of the district and in operation of the contract and the
lands affected thereby; it fixes the status of all property within
the district lawfully affected by the contract, final judgment
forecloses further inquiry into matters to which it properly
relates, and within its pertinent issues it is binding on the
world at large.
[2] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Confirmation Proceedings-Pleading.-In a proceeding by an irrigation district to obtain confirmation of a contract entered into with the United States,
by which the United States undertook to deliver water from
the Central Valley Project to the district and to expend funds
for construction of a distribution system within the district,
the State Engineer, who appeared after a default against him
was set aside, had the right to file an answer by his own
counsel. (Gov. Code, §§ 11040, 11041.)
[3] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Confirmation Proceedings-Decree.
- I f a contract entered into by an irrigation district with the
United States under the Irrigation District Federal Coopera[1] See Cal.Jur., Waters,§ 612 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Waters, § 515; [2] Waters, § 517;
[3] Waters, §520(1); [4] Waters, §522; [5] Waters, §518;
[6] Waters,§§ 40, 45; [7] Waters,§ 75; [8] Waters,§ 154; [9, 13,
20, 25, 27, 32, 40] Waters, § 538; [10, 11, 18] Waters, § 24; [12,
16] Waters, § 287; [14] Waters, §§ 24, 314; [15] Waters, § 299;
[17] Waters, §25; [19] Waters, §1; [21, 26, 34] Waters, §§529,
538; [22-24] Waters, §§ 529, 534; [28] Constitutional Law, § 159;
[29, 30] Waters, § 318; [31, 33] Waters, § 539; [35, 37] Waters,
§ 514; [36] Statutes, §.10; [38, 39] Public Utilities, § 10; [41]
Waters, § 529.
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tion Law (Wat. Code, § 23175 et seq.) fails of confirmation
on one material ground it must fail of confirmation as a whole.
(Wat. Code,§ 22680.)
!d.-Irrigation Districts-Confirmation Proceedings-Appeal.
-In a proceeding by by an irrigation district to obtain confirmation of a contract entered into with the United States,
by which the United States undertook to deliver water from
the Central Valley Project to the district and to expend funds
for construction of a distribution system within the district,
the injunctive provisions of a judgment prohibiting the district from refusing or failing to supply water to an owner
of irrigable land within the district and from proceeding under
the contract may be disregarded on appeal where the judgment declaring invalidity of the contract must be affirmed,
and they may not be taken as prohibiting the parties from
negotiating a new contract or from continuing distribution of
water pending such negotiations.
!d.-Irrigation Districts-Confirmation Proceedings-Hearing.-In a proceeding by an irrigation district to obtain
confirmation of a contract entered into with the United States,
by which the United States undertook to deliver water from
the Central Valley Project to the district and to expend funds
for construction of a distribution system within the district,
the trial court properly refused to eliminate the issue of title
or ownership of water from the case where the United States
had acquired in its own name rights to certain domestic waters
which were essential to the success of the Central Valley Project and which were not acquired for any purpose other than
for the use and benefit of such project, and where a trust
relationship existed between the state and water users of the
state, including water users of the district, as to all waters the
control of which had been acquired by the state by appropriation or purchase.
!d.-Riparian Rights-Nature and Extent of Right.-Under the
common-law doctrine of riparian rights, the riparian owner
had the right to insist that the full flow of the stream continue
to pass by his land in its natural state whether or not he
needed the water; such a right was a property right which
vested in such owner and was protected by state and federal
Constitutions, and could not be limited or impaired without
due process of law and just compensation.
!d.-Riparian Rights-As Restricted to Beneficial Use.-Subsequent to adoption of Const., art. XIV, § 3, in 1928, subjecting
enjoyment of the riparian right to the rule of reasonable beneficial use, vested rights of the riparian owner continue to
attach to his land as a part and parcel of the land itself, and
as such are necessarily protected from unlawful encroachment
by both state and federal Constitutions.
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[8a, 8b] !d.-Appropriation of Water-Waters Appropriable.The people of the state may avail themselves hy appropriation
or other lawful means of the right to the use of waters to
which a prior lawful use has not attached, and unappropriated
domestic waters of the state come within this category.
[9] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Property and Water Rights.-An
irrigation district is trustee for landowners within the district
and limited in its trust to receive and distribute water to them.
[10] !d.-Ownership-Status of State as Trustee.-The state is not
the owner of domestic water of the state in the sense that it
has absolute power and dominion over it to the exclusion of
rights of those who have the beneficial interest; the title is
an equitable one residing in the water users of the state, and
the state as an entity is the holder of the legal title as trustee
for the benefit of the people of the state, all of whom in the
last analysis are the water users of the state.
[11] !d.-Ownership-Conditions Precedent.-Compliance with
provisions of the ·water Code and related statutory provisions
is necessary in order that the right of the people of the state
to use domestic water, individually, collectively or in a corporate capacity, may be acquired, and such compliance must
be consistent with the trust relationship incident to the right
to use the water.
[12] !d.-Transfer of Water Rights.-Occupying a trust relationship to the people, as water users of the state, it would be
incompetent for the state to divest itself of legal title to
domestic waters by grant, assignment or otherwise, inconsistent
with rights of the beneficiaries, and it would be inconsistent
with the trust for the state to attempt to pass the legal title
freed from the trust to any third party, including the United
States.
[13] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Property and Water Rights.-As
trustee for the people, as water users of the state, the state and
its agencies, including an irrigation district, are bound faithfully to administer the trust and are answerable to the courts,
in the exercise of their traditional powers in equity, for the
proper discharge of their stewardship; they must administer
it consistently and not in violation of the rights of the beneficiaries.
[14] !d.-Ownership-Status as Trustee: Contracts Pertaining to
Water Rights.-The state in the administration of its trust
for users of domestic waters may prescribe or provide for
reasonable terms or conditions to which beneficiaries must
conform in order to have the benefit of expenditures made
[8] See Cal.Jur., Waters, § 236; Am.Jur., Waters, § 294.
[9] See Cal.Jur., Waters, § 638.
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necessary in providing benefits, and these terms or conditions
may be provided for by statute or by contracts when duly
authorized by law.
[15a, 15b] !d.-Transfer of Water Rights-Rights and Duties of
Transferee.-When an outside party, such as the United States,
by contract, legislation or otherwise, steps into the shoes of the
state to administer a trust for the benefit of water users by
development, conservation and distribution of the trust res,
it is bound by the same rules of law as surround and govern
the state or any other purveyor of waters of the state for the
benefit of its water users, as trustee for such beneficial owners,
and it is answerable for the faithful performance of such
trust.
[16] !d.-Transfer of Water Rights-Powers of State.-The state
may not lawfully dispossess itself of the title to domestic
water and may not surrender its control thereof in any way
inconsistent with administration of the trust under which title
is held, but may by general law prescribe the terms and conditions under which the several classes of water users may
become secure in their right to the water and use thereof.
[17] !d.-Ownership-Private Rights.-Water users of the state
whose rights have not become vested by statute or contract,
but who are dependent on an adequate supply of fresh water
for their existence in the manifold uses to which it may be
supplied, have an inchoate right to such uses subject to enforcement and equal protection of the law, and such right is necessarily dependent on compliance with reasonable rules and regulations attending it and to the circumstances of each case,
such as an adequate water supply, ability of the supplier to
furnish the water, and reasonable payment for the service.
[18a, 18b] !d.-Ownership-Status of State as Trustee.-Title to
unappropriated domestic waters of the state is in the State
of California in trust; the trust character of such title is
anchored in the state by constitutional provisions, by statutes
enacted in furtherance thereof, and by decisional law of the
state; the beneficiaries of such trust are the water users of
the state who in a general sense constitute all of the people
of the state; among such beneficiaries are present or prospective users who individually or in properly classified groups
bring themselves within the orbit of the state law under which
they may be in a position to demand benefits without discrimination; and within such category are the landowners of
an irrigation district.
[19] Id.-Law Governing.-The federal government both by legislation and court decision has recognized that the law of this
state is determinative of rights to water in this state.
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[20a., 20b] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Property and Water Rights.In all transactions affecting rights to domestic water between
the United States and the State of California or its
such as an irrigation district, the
are
with trust
property held by the state or by those who have acquired
rights to it from the state or otherwise
the benefit of the
real owners, who are the present and
of the state who may become entitled
and whatever interest or title the United States has acquired
to water
appropriation,
or other means in furtherance
the execution of its trust relationship with the
water users of the state is
to applicable
water law of the state.
[2la, 2lb] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Contracts: Property and
Water Rights.-Insofar as a contract between an irrigation
district and the United States provides for the construction
of works for the storage and distribution of water to and by
the district, the relationship of the parties is that of debtor
and creditor; on completion of the construction work the district is obligated under the law to pay for the same within
40 years in equal annual installments, and on completion of
such payments the district is entitled to ownership of the
works and property of the storage and distribution system
free from any claims of the United States.
[22] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Contracts: Incurring Debts.-An
irrigation district contracting with the United States for the
construction of a distribution system within the district is
authorized by law to obtain funds for that purpose from the
United States with or without the issuance of irrigation district bonds (Wat. Code, §§ 23280-23289), and it can contract
for the payment for water distributed to it by or through an
outside source at a fixed point of delive1·y on the payment of
charges agreed on from funds of its own, if available. (W at.
Code, § 22228.)
[23] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Contracts: Incurring Debts-Giving Security.-The United States has the right to demand that
assurances of security for repayment of monies advanced by it
to an irrigation district for construction of a distribution
system within the district he included in the contract between
the district and the United States providing for such construction.
[24] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Contracts: Incurring Debts-Repayment.-An irrigation district has the right and duty to include
in its contract with the United States for construction of a
dish·ihution system within the district exprrss provisions for
adequate clearance of its obligations to repay, including the
designation of the amount expended or to be expended by the
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United States for the benefit of the district and its landowners, or a workable provision as to how the money advanced
by the United States may be ascertained when the time for
final accounting, repayment and acquittance arrives, together
with designation of a definite time when repayment is finally
due.
[25] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Contracts: Property and Water
Rights.-A provision in a contract between an irrigation district and the United States for construction of a distributing
system within the district that the United States may acquire
property within the district in its own name for the purpose
of constructing such system and that the United States may
divest itself of ownership only in such manner as may be
provided by Congress, is contrary to the debtor-creditor relationship existing between the United States and the district
in view of the district's right, upon final repayment, to conveyance of the property not dependent on any future act of
Congress.
[26a-26c] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Contracts: Property and
Water Rights.-No limitation may be placed on the power of
the United States to sell and convey its own lands, but in
distributing water contracted to be delivered to an irrigation
district the United States does so as a purveyor of water at
a price for the benefit of water users of the district and, in
so delivering water to the district, it is not competent for
the United States or the district to discriminate against present or potential water users in the district on the basis of the
amount of land owned by them, and the 160-acre limitation
contained in the original Reclamation Act of 1902 (32 Stats.,
p. 388) is inapplicable to the subject matter of a contract
entered into by such district with the United States, by which
the United States undertakes to deliver water from the Central
Valley Project to the district and to expend funds for the
construction of a distribution system within the district.
[27] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Property and Water Rights.-Discrimination among water users in an irrigation district is
expressly contrary to state law. (Wat. Code, § 22250.)
[28] Constitutional Law-Equal Protection of Laws-Classification.-Although a law is general and constitutional when it
applies equally to all persons embraced in a class founded on
some natural or intrinsic or constitutional distinction, it is
not general or constitutional if it confers particular privileges
or imposes peculiar disabilities or burdensome conditions, in
the exercise of a common right, on a class of persons arbitrarily selected from the general body of those who stand in
precisely the same relation to tlH' subjPct of thP law.
[29] Waters-Contracts Pertaining to Water Rights-Validity.'l'he extent of the right of an owneT of real propeTty to the
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use and enjoyment of his property
including the water
right which may be attached thereto, cannot be constitutionally limited on the sole basis of the amount of property
he owns, especially with reference to property of the same kind
and similarly situated.
[30] !d.-Contracts Relating to Water Rights-Validity.-The
owner of a property right which is or may be appurtenant to all
of his land suitable for irrigation cannot be limited in the
enjoyment of that right to 160 acres of his larger holdings;
the same right should attach to his lands in excess of 160
acres and to the excess lands of all those similarly situated.
[31] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Property and Water Rights.Though W at. Code, § 23200, provides that under contracts
between an irrigation district and the United States with relation to the right to use water acquired by the district the
water "shall be distributed and apportioned by the district
in accordance with the applicable acts of Congress," the owners
of irrigable lands and water users within the district are not
subject to the 160-acre limitation contained in the Federal
Reclamation Act of 1902, since Wat. Code, § 23200, contemplates that "applicable" federal law shall apply, and the 160acre limitation is inapplicable where title to the water to be
purveyed is not an unlimited title in the United States since
it is holding such title as trustee for the water users.
[32a, 32b] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Property and Water Rights.lnsofar as a contract between an irrigation district and the
United States provides for furnishing water to the district
for a price, the United States in acting as a purveyor of domestic waters of the state to the district is bound to observe and
comply with state laws with reference to the rights vested
in the water users being served or entitled to be served, and
in this respect neither the state nor any of its agencies may
contract or otherwise provide that the distribution of water
to those for whose benefit the right to the water was acquired
may be arbitrarily discontinued.
[33] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Property and Water Rights.-A
provision of the Reclamation Act of 1902 (32 Stats., p. 388)
that "Nothing in this act shall be construed as affecting or
intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws
of any state . . . relating to the control, appropriation, use or
distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right
acquired thereunder and the Secretary of the Interior in carrying out the provisions of this act, shall proceed in conformity
with such laws," controls the operations of the Department
of Interior so far as federal law is concerned and, under the
controlling state law, the furnishing of water to consumers
must be subject to and be in conformity with certain rules
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under the
of the state.
[34]
Districts--Contracts: Property and Water
Rights.~To construe
contract between an irrigation district
and the United States
and for construction
of a distribution
within the district as imposing on
the district and landowners a burden under which they might
suffer the loss of water
at the discretion of the United
States would be
to c<mstitutional principles.
[35] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Confirmation Proceedings-Validating Acts.-The
of a contraet between an irrigation
distriet and the United States for a water supply and for construction of a distribution system within the district was not
established by the Second Validating Act of 1949 (Stats. 1949,
p. 1511), where the contract was not in existence when such
act was passed, and where it was approved by the electors of
the district and signed after the Legislature had adjourned,
though before the effective date of the act.
[36] Statutes-Validating Acts.-A. validation act assumes legislative consciousness of some act or omission on the part of
the public body n1Tocted which is designed to he cured or confirmed, and after J1nal adjournment of the Legislature and until
effective date of the act (90 days thereafter) there is no opportunity for the exercise of this legislative purpose to function.
[37] Waters-Irrigation Districts-Validating Acts.-If a contract between an irrigation district and the United States for
a water supply and for construction of a distribution system
be deemed to include a utility type contract at the option of
the United States, the Second Validating Aet of 1949 (Stats.
1949, p. 1511) or any validating act of a similar character could
not render such contract valid, since the Legislature may ratify
only what it could have theretofore authorized, and it could
not by a general ratifying statute breathe validity into a contract the effect of which would be to avoid all laws of the
state, both constitutional and statutory, respecting the regulation and control of publie utilities.
(38] Public Utilities-Regulation.-Assuming the Legislature's
plenary power to enact laws respecting the regulation and
control of public utilities notwithstanding any constitutional
provision to the contrary (Canst., art. XII, § 22), nevertheless
such legislation must appear on its face to be cognate and
germane to the regulation of public utilities.
[39] Id.-Regulation.-There being nothing on the face of the
Second Validating Act of 1949 (Stats. 1949, p. 1511) to indicate that it relates to the regulation and control of public
utilities, it is ineffective to circumvent the laws of the state
requiring regulation and control of activities which are in all
essential respects those of a public utility.
and
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Waters-Irrigation Districts-Property and Water Rights.When a purveyor of domestic waters of
water to lands for irrigation
a vested

for a
between the district and the United

state furnishes

contract

!d.-Irrigation Districts-Contracts.--A
in a contract between an
district and the
States purporting to condition the delivery of water to a landowner otherwise entitled to delivery on
him of any assessment
a void assessment,
levied, though judicially declared to
may be taken as a reasonable and additional assurance of
reimbursements to the United States for
incurred
on behalf of the district and to
furnishing water to the
legitimate subject of contract.

APPEAIJS from a judgment of the
County. Benjamin C. Jones, Ju(\ge.*

Court of Tulare
Affirmed.

Proceeding by an irrigation district to obtain confirmation
of a contract entered into by it with the United States, by
which the United States undertook to deliver \Yater from the
Central Valley Project to the district and to expend funds for
the construction of a distribution system within the district.
,Judgment for objecting defendants, affirmed.
E. I. Peemster, James R McBride, Ralph l\1. Brody, Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, B. Abbott Goldberg and
Adolphus Moskovitz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Appellants.
Roy A. Gnstafson, District Attorney (Yentura), James E.
Dixon, Deputy Distriet Attorney, J. J_~ee Rankin, Solicitor
General of the United Statrs, Perry \Y. Morton, Assistant Attorney General, DaYid R \Varner anll
P. Marquis,
Attomcys, Department of Jnstie(~. as Amiei Cmiae on behalf
of Appellants.
*Assigned by Chairman of .Judicial Connell.
tHeportcr's Note: '!'he
for the Feden!l
of :Jus·
tiee participated in the trial
ns Amiei
on lJehnlf
of the plaintiff distrid. 'l'hey
no briefs aJl(l did not otherwise
participate on appeal Pxcept that as Amici Curiae the;- 1iler1 a memo·
randum in support of the 1wtition for a rehearing.
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Horton & Knox, Harry W. Horton, M. 1:\. Bailey, W. R.
Bailey, Henry Holsinger, Principal Attorney, Division of
Water Resources, and Gavin M. Craig, Senior Attorney, for
Respondents.
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, Herman Phleger, Alvin J.
Rockwell, ,John lVL Naff, Jr., Edson Abel, Sherwood Green
and Green, Green & Bartow as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents.
SHENK, J.-'rhe plaintiff Ivanhoe Irrigation District and
certain of the defendants appeal from a judgment refusing
to confirm a proposed contract between, the United States,
acting by and through the Bureau of Reclamation of the
Department of the Interior, and the district. The contract
provides for the delivery of a supply of water for irrigation
purposes from the Central Valley Project and for the construction of a distribution system to make the water available
for beneficial use on the lands within the district.
On September 23, 1949, the plaintiff district, purporting
to act under the Irrigation District Federal Cooperation Law
(Wat. Code, § 23175 et seq.), entered into the contract with
the United States. As required by law the contract was
approved by the California Districts Securities Commission,
but with reservations (\Yat. Code, §§ 23222 and 24253), and
by the district's electors (W at. Code, § 23220 et seq).
[1] This proceeding was commenred by the district on October 31, 1949, in the Superior Conrt in and for the County of
Tulare to have the contract ronfirmed. Confirmation is required by federal law (Omnibus ..::\djnstment Act of 1926,
§ 46, 44 Stats. 649, 650, 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1946), Federal
Reclamation Laws, Ann. 318-319), by section 42 of the contract and by the Water Code of the State of California
( § 22670 et seq., § 23225). It is a special proceeding in rem,
and summons was by publication. It was brought against
all per:;;ons having or claiming to have an interest in the
formation of the plaintiff district and in the operation of
the proposed contract and the lands affected thereby. It
will fix the :;;tatns of all property within the district lawfully
affected by the contract and a final judgment will foreclose
further inquiry into the matters to which the judgment properly relates. \Vithin its pertinent issues it will be binding
on tlJC world at largf~. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1908; Becher v.
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~~----------·----------

-----------------------

Contoure
27fJ U.S. 388 [49 S.Ct. 356, 73 L.Ed.
752] ; Riley v. New York Tntst Co., 815 U.S. 348 [62 S.Ct. 608,
86 L.Ed. 885] ; see Jlrcnchman-Camln·idge hr. Dist. v. Ferguson, 154 Ncb. 20 [46 N.W.2d 6fJ2].) 'rho judgment is limited
to a determination of the validity of the contract. As necessarily incident thereto questions relating to the title to and
the control to be exercised over the unappropriated domestic
waters of the state, to the distribution and sale of those
waters by the district and to the ownership of the distributing
system to be acquired by the district, will be considered.
Originally only two parties appeared as parties defendant,
the first being the People of the State of California, acting
by and through the attorney general. The other appearing
defendant is Courtney McCracken, the owner of 309 acres
of irrigable land within the district. He filed a demurrer
on December 13, 1949, and an answer on November 11,
1950. He is a bachelor and those provisions of the contract
( §§ 34, 35 and 36) which would limit to a single person the
ownership of no more than 160 acres of land entitled to the
distribution of water, particularly are sought to be applied
to him. He is a nonresident of the district and could not,
under terms of the applicable law (Wat. Code, § 23220 et seq.)
vote for or against approval of the contract. He opposes
confirmation for numerous reasons but particularly on the
ground that the 160-acre limitation hereinafter considered
is not applicable and is invalid as to him and his property
within the district .
.A default was entered against everyone not appearing
within the time specified in the published notice of service.
'l'he United States did not formally appear but caused the
Regional Counsel and .Assistant Regional Counsel of the
Bureau of Reclamation of the Department of the Interior
to request permission to appear as amici curiae. Objection
to such an appearance was interposed by the then attorney
general on the ground that the United States was a party
interested in the proceeding and should appear as such. The
objection was overruled and the request granted. Federal
counsel thus appeared and took part in the proceedings
throughout the trial.
The State Engineer is Chief of the Division of Water
Resources of the Department of Public Works and pursuant
to law has exercised the duties imposed upon the Water Com-
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mission. 1
trial eourt, but al that tinw 1hc
aside the default or the State

on its own motion, set
and he appeared and
(·Omlst~l as he had the right to do.
11041.) He stated Hmt his interest in the
was 10
the state water law from impairment, aml that in the event the court saw fit to validate the
contrad he
1he court to confirm what he claimed to
be established state law relating to the title of the state's
\Yater resources and regulations pertaining thereto. The
relief which he seeks will be hereinafter noted.
Counsel Jor the Di Giorgio Fruit Corporation, the owner
of large areas of irrigated and irrigable lands in the San
,Joaquin
iu and out of the district, appeared as amici
curiae and participated in the trial in opposition to confirmation of the contract.
The petition sets forth the essential facts as a basis for
the request for confirmation. 'fhe prayer is that the court
examine and enquire into the proceedings for the organization
of the distriet and the validity of the contract, and that a
judgment be entered confirming· those proceedings and the
eontract. A copy of the proposed contract is attached to the
petition and made a part thereof.
On Deeember 13, 1949, the attorney general filed a general
and special demurrer on behalf of the state in which he attacked the validity of the contract sought to be confirmed.
Before the drmnrrcr was ruled upon and on November 8,
1950, he filed an ans>ver reiterating as defensive matter the
position taken in the demurrer, which >vas (1) that the
proposed contract would be an unconstitutional delegation
of the legislatiw pmver of California to Congress, to the
Secretary of the Interior, and to the district, acting jointly;
(2) that certain land limitation provisions of the Reclamation Laws which the contract purports to apply within the
district are not applicable to the land within the district; (3)
that the contract uneonstitntionally deprives owners of excess
land of property without due process of law; ( 4) that the
Irrigation District Federal Cooperation Law of the State
of California, under 1vhich the district purports to proceed,
violates the Constitution and laws of the State of California
1
Under the provisions of A.B. 4, ch. G2, l!lGG l~irst Extra Sess.,
effective July G, lDGG, these duties, with tho exception of supervision
of water distribution, were trnnsforrer1 to the now State Water Rights
Board, and the new Director of the Department of Water Resources
assumed the functions of the Water Resources Board.
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laws may be
not authorized
federal law.
of
state was that a
be entered
take
the petition; that a declarathe
and duties among themselves of
the State of
the United States, the plaintiff District and the landowners therein with respect to the contract,
and for all other proper relief.
On March 7, 1951, in open
the
general
leave to withdraw the original answer of the State
of California and to file an amended answer. Permission
granted and the amended answer was filed on March
1951, seeking the confirmation of the contract.
The filing of the amended answer occurred after conferences
and correspondence between the state's representatives and
the Secretary of the Interior. In his letter of March 5, 1951,
the Secretary of the Interior stated that questions "with
respect to the historical, present and future ownership of
>Yater or water rights" would seem "to be immaterial to the
question whether a particular contract for water service or
for the construction of a distribution system, or both, is a
valid one and to the question of the authority of the district
to enter into it"; that he did not believe "that a finding that
the contractual obligations are valid is determinative of the
title of the water", and that the question "whether an individual water user, or a district may have a legal right to
demand the continual delivery of project water after the
expiration of the 40 year term of a water service clearly is not
affected by a finding that the contract of itself is binding
during its own express term."
In response to the letter of March 5, 1951, the attorney
general replied, under date of l\Iarch 22, 1951, that "It is
my view that this contract is not intended to and does not
deal with, determine, or settle any questions with respect
to the historical, present or future claims of ownership of
water or water rights that are now or may hereafter be
urged by the United States, the State of California, the
Ivanhoe Irrigation District, or individual or corporate landowners or users of the water, the furnishing of which is
provided for by the said contract.''
To the letter of March 22, 1951, the Secretary of the Interior replied under date of March 27, 1951, in which he
agreed with the attorney general that the ownership of water
47 C.2d-20
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or water
the r~ontrad or by
the validation
He eonelnclcd that it won1(1 follow
that vvater will be :,mpplied pursuant to appropriatiom; filed
by the United States,
ions file<1
t1w state and assigned to the l;nited States, and rights
by contract
and othenvisc from private illC1ividuals and corporations; that
as to such water, the United States will contraet only to furnish
a supply and to be paid for services rendered; that the contracts will not and will not purport to affect the ownership
of the water or rights thereto, and that the owiJership of
water or water rights by a water district or a landowner
therein will be no different than had the supply been furnished
by the Water Project Authority of the state.
Notwithstanding the foregoing the allegations of paragraphs
VI and VIII of the original answer on behalf of the state
and the same numbered paragraphs of the amended answer
in effect remainell the same. Paragraph VI of the amended
answer alleges that the State of California, acting through
its Department of Finance, pursuant to state law, previously
filed with the Division of ·water Resources of the Department
of Public \Vorks of California certain applications for the
appropriation of the unappropriated waters of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers and their tributaries for the
use and benefit of the Central Valley Project and the owners
of lands to he irrigated therefrom; that by assignments, made
pursuant to statute, the State of California, again acting
through its Department of Finance, assigned to the United
States for the use and benefit of the Central Valley Project
certain of those applications.
Paragraph VIII of the state's amended answer alleges
that by virtue of the terms of the applications, the state has
become and is the trustor of an express trust; that by the
assignments the United States has become and is the trustee
of that trust; that the landowners to be served from the
works of the Central Valley Project, including the landowners of plaintiff district, have become and are the benefic-iaries of that trust; that any and all claims or interests of
the United States obtained by the proposed contract are held
by the United States as such trustee as a part of a trust
corpus or res for the use and benefit of the Central Valley
Project and the landowners to be served water from the works
of that project, ancl in particular the landowners of plaintiff
District; that the State of California is entitled to be heard,
among other things, as to all matters relating to the ad-
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ministration and execution of the trust by the United States
aud is entitled to require that the trustee administer the
trust according to its true intent and meaning.
However in apparent furtherance of the understanding
between the attorney general and the Secretary of the Interior it was alleged in paragraph XI of the amended answer that the validity of the contract "does not depend on
whether the United States has rights to the water to be
delivered by it pursuant to the contract or rights to the use
thereof or title or ownership thereto; ... that an adjudication of such rights to water or the use thereof or title or
ownership thereto is not appropriate in this proceeding, and
that such an adjudication herein would be contrary to the
best interests of the State and of the United States." Copies
of correspondence between the Secretary of the Interior and
the attorney general, including the letters above referred to,
were attached as exhibits to the amended answer.
The prayer of the amended answer is "(1) that the district's legal capacity and authority to enter into the contract,
the proceedings on the part of the district for the authorization of the execution of the contract, and the execution of
the contract between the I van hoe Irrigation District and the
United States be confirmed and declared valid; and (2) that
the decree in this proceeding recite that on the issues properly raised in this proceeding the decree is not required to and
does not purport to be an adjudication of the right or interest
of the State of California or of its agencies, including but
not limited to the I van hoe Irrigation District and the Water
Project Authority, or of the right or interest of the United
States or its agencies, or all or any of the above, in or to the
waters or water rights or respecting the regulation of the
use thereof under the laws of the State of California, involved
in the Central Valley Project.
"AND WHEREFORE, the \Vater Project Authority which is
not taking any position on the validity of the contract between
the Ivanhoe Irrigation District and the United States, prays
that the decree in this proceeding recite that on the issues
properly raised in this proceeding the deeree is not required
to and does not purport to be an adjudication of the right or
interest of the State of California or of its agencies including
but not limited to the Ivanhoe Irrigation District and the
\Vater Project Authority, or of the right or interest of the
United States or its agencies, or any or all of the above, in
or to the waters or water rights or respecting the regulation
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of the
involved in the Central
On the
set for
that the district
of the Water
that the
the default of the
The Authority
joint answer served as the amemkd answer
California, heretofore set out in
and the
Authority. The latter assumed a neutral attitude so far as
the Yalidity of the contract was
and
that
a decree issue
the rights of the parties but not purporting to adjudicate the
or interest in or to water or
\.Yater rights or
or nse thereof under
the laws of the state. The principal
for the Division
of \Vater Resources of the Department of Public \Vorks
appeared as amicus curiae on behalf of the \Vater Project
Authority.
The trial of the case insofar as the taking of evidence was
concerned took place on April 3, 1951. 'rhe reeorc1 consists of
documentary evidence and other matters of which the court
may take judicial notice. There are no
questions of
fact. Briefing in the trial court was extensiYe and oral argument was not presented until more than a year later. The
findings of fact and conclusions of law \vere
and judgment was entered on Fehrnary 27, 1953, denying confirmation of the contract on numerous grounds. [3] Under the
statute if the contract fails of confirmation on one material
ground it must fail of confirmation as a whole. (See ·wat. Code,
§ 22680.) However, as the trial eonrt refused confirmation
more than one must be rnled upon for the
on many
guidance of the trial court in possible further proceedings.
[4] The judgment contained injunctive orders prohibiting the
district from refusing or failing to supply to the defendant
Courtney McCracken water for irrigating purposes for all
of his lands within the district and in
from proceeding under the contract. Since the judgment declaring the
invalidity of the contract must be affirmed. the injunctive
provisions may be
NeithrJ' t1JO~c provisions nor
anytldng herein should he taken as prohibiting the eontraeting
parties from renegotiating a nrw contract or from continuing
the distribution of water pending such negotiations.
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the
and on March 17 by the
State of California and the \Vater Project
State of California. 'l'he district and the
briefs have been filed by
state have
McCracken
the judgment
who seeks a
decwater rights under
status of the state in relation to water
the status of the United States as
trustee for the benefit of the project water users, and the
cocct.uvu of certain provisions of the federal Reclamation
Aets of 1902 and 1939 hereinafter referred to.
Amici curiae briefs in support of the judgment have been
filed by the California l<'arm Bureau Federation and the
Di Giorgio Pruit Corporation. An amicus curiae brief has
been filed by the Ventura County F'lood Control District,
which does not attack the judgment as to the invalidity of
the contract but contends that the court's conclusion of law
to the effect that the water rights involved are appurtenant
to the lands upon which the water is now used or is to be
used, is not in accordance with existing law. The federal
government is not a party to the appeal but it is apparent
that its attitude is reflected in the position of the attorney
general, particularly \vith reference to the 160-acre limitation
hereafter di1>cussed. There is no disagreement on the part
of any party appearing as to the correctness of the judgment
of the trial court that the title to and control over the unappropriated domestic waters of the state are vested in the state
in trust for the water users of the state.
The questions raised in this case cannot be answered without
reference to the nature and character of the title to the water
rights involved. Closely related thereto and in part determinative thereof arc the efforts put forth by the state in aid
of the development of its water resources for the benefit of
the people of the state, which efforts finally resulted in part
in the Central Valley Project. From the beginning it was
realized that the growth and development of the state, from
the standpoint of agriculture, industry, population and general welfare, required sources of water supply in addition to
the annual rainfall and underground supplies. This was
especially true in the vast arid or semi-arid sections of the
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of the Saeramento
and San ,Joaquin Hivees.
Authorization to inquire into the problem \vas provided for
as early as 1850. (Stats. 1850, p. 256.) These efforts were
repeated in 1878 (Stats. 1878, p. 634), in 1911 (Stats. 1911,
p. 822), in 1D13 by the adoption of the Water Commission
Act (Stats. 1913, p. 1012), and in 1915 (Stats. 1915, p. 514).
In 1921 a state-wide conservation plan study \vas authorized
(Stats. 1921, p. 1685) and reports thereon were made to the
Legislature in 1923 in Public vVorks Bulletins Numbers 4,
5 and 6. In 1923 the Legislature failed to furnish funds for
further studies and money was provided by the Chambers of
Commerce of Los Angeles and San Francisco for that purpose.
A further report was made in 1925 in Public \Vorks Bulletin
Number 9. This report emphasized the needed coordinated
development in the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys.
In 1925 the Legislature provided for further studies and
reports (Stats. 1925, p. 1013) ·which were made to the Legislature in 1927 by Public Works Bulletins Numbers 12, 13, 14,
15 and 16. These reports also emphasized the needed coordinated development in the Sacramento and San Joaquin valleys.
Following these reports the Legislature in 1927 (Stats. 1927,
p. 508) deemed it advisable to provide for the appropriation
within the provisions of the then \Vater Commission Act e>f
all of the unappropriated waters of the various streams of
the state which might be needed for the coordinated plan of
conservation in the central valleys. It was under this authorization that the Director of Finance, beginning in 1927, filed
some 37 applications on behalf of the state on streams within
the central valley area, some of which were intended for the
storage of water in the Friant Reservoir of the San Joaquin
River and the construction of the proposed main canal southerly therefrom through the area of plaintiff district. Several
of these filings cover water which is essential to the Central
Valley Project.
As the result of the prolonged studies and planning by the
state, the Legislature in 1933 enacted a statute designating
the Sacramento-San Joaquin coordinated project as the
Central Valley Project, and created the Water Project Authority as an agency of the state to construct, operate and
cover the cost of the project, estimated at $170,000,000. (Stats.
1933, p. 2643.) The units and works to constitute the Project
were defined in the statute. They included, among other
works, Friant Dam and the Friant-Kern Canal to conduct
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water to and through the Ivanhoe area. That act is now
contained in sections 11100-11830 of the ·water Code. 2
The Central Valley Project Act authorized the issuance
and sale of $170,000,000 in revenue bonds. But in those days
of depression and unemployment, such bonds were of doubtful
or uncertain financial favor so far as the investing public
was concerned. At any rate they were not sold and the
state turned to the federal government for financial assistance.
The problem then confronting the state was simply one of
money. It is an undeniable fact that the State of California,
without federal or other outside assistance, could have followed through with its plans for the development of the
Central Valley Project if it had had the money with which
to do it. The state was well equipped with an engineering
staff and other expert assistance in its Department of Public
\Vorks, Division of ·water Resources, to construct and
operate necessary works and facilities to do all that has been
done by the United States. All that was needed was the
money available through state channels and expendable under
the authority of the state alone. The Legislature contemplated and required that the Water Project Authority "proceed with the construction of the project immediately upon
funds being available therefor" (Wat. Code, § 11452) and
that the Authority have ''full charge and control of the
construction, operation, and maintenance of the Project and
the collection of all rates, charges and revenues from it''
(Wat. Code, § 11451).
The studies of California water problems by the Board
of Public Works through the State Engineer pursuant to
legislative authority beginning in 1921 and extending over
a ten-year period at state expense were far-reaching. They
have been characterized as ''the most comprehensive and
thoroughgoing set of studies instituted by a state agency
looking to the development of its natural resources.'' (History
of Legislation and Policy Formation of the Central Valley
Project, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural
Economics [1946].) The report based on these studies (Public Works Bulletin 25, Report to Legislature of 1931 on
State Water Plan) was officially approved by the I1egislature
2
An overall state water plan, entitled "The California Water Plan,"
was undertaken by the Director of Water Resources and a preliminary
report was issued entitled "Report on the California Water Plan, Preliminary Edition," State Water Resources Board, Bull. No. 3, May,
1956."
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§ 10001.) Adin 1941. (Stats.
the result of the
mittedly the Central
planning,
Reclamation, but it is
of Interior to be the creature of the state. This is shown
by the testimony of the Commissioner of
relation to the
's 1948
1s
follows: "The
also necessary to understand this
This project has
been a dream of over half a century in California. The Bureau of Reclamation did not start this
It has been
made the agent for completing it." (Hearings before the
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House
of Representatives, Eightieth Congress, First Session on the
Interior Department Appropriation Bill for 1948, p. 723.)
Faced with lack of state funds sufficient to finance such
an extensive enterprise application was made to the United
States for loans or grants of federal funds sufficient to
construct the initial units of the project. The loans soughi
were to be secured by the revenue bonds of the Projrct
Authority authorized by the Central Valley Project Act.
Although the engineering feasibility and the need for the
project were recognized by the Financial Division of the
Public Works Administration, and several other federal
agencies reported favorably on the project, the economic
soundness of the project was questioned and efforts along
these lines were terminated. However, in 1935 the project
was referred to the Bureau of Reclamation of the Department of the Interior for study. In the report of the Secretary of the Interior to the President on the 26th of November,
J 935 (Booklet of Information for Conferences Brtween U .S.
Dept. of the Interior and Water Project Authority of thE'
State of California [Aug. 28,1940], p. 16), on the feasibility
of the project it is stated: "The next declaration required
iR that the cost of construction will probably be returnE-d
to tlw Federal Government. This is interpreted to mean
that it will be returned within forty years from the time the
Secretary issues public notice that water is avallable from
thE' Project works. The estimated cost of construction is
$170,000,000.00 and the annnal cost. including repayment of
all other charges, is $7,500,000.00. It is rstimntE'd that the
annual revenues from the sale of water and of rlPetric powrr
will be sufficient to cover these charges. The favorable conditions herE-tofore recitE-d justify thE' belief that the projE-ct
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President
federal reclamasupra, p.
'rhe
recommendation of the
of the Inlater reduced to $4,200,000
under the
Helie£ .1\ppropriation Act of 1935, to
initiate construction of the
In that same year, with
the passage of the Hivers and Harbors Act on August 30,
a direct contribution
$12,000,000 from federal funds
was authorized for the construction of Kennett (now Shasta)
Dam. ( U. S. Stats., 49 Stats., p. 1038.) Thereafter Congress
regularly made funds available to the Bureau of Reclamation for the construction of the project, and prior to August
:n, 1951, a total of $396,987,427 had been appropriated.
The Bureau of Reclamation established an office in Sacramento and commenced work on the project in 1935. Work
on the project units including the plaintiff district's unit
has been continuously prosecuted. It is to be noted that the
allocations of funds by the federal government were generally
made with a proviso that such funds were reimbursable in
accordance with the reclamation laws. (See First Deficiency
Appropriation Act of 19~l6, June 22, 1986; Booklet of Information, supra, pp. 23, 24, 25, 30, 31.)
There can be no question but that the Federal Bureau
of Reclamation and not the "\Vater Project Authority of the
state has constructed those units of the Central Valley Project heretofore completed. But it appears from the foregoing
and the following that the parties contemplated a state
project to be eventually owned and operated by the state.
The "\Vater Project Authority, at the request of the bureau,
was in close cooperation with the bureau throughout. On
March 25, 1936, a cooperative contract was executed between
the United States and the Water Project Authority. This
was followed by four additional supplemental contracts on
J\Jarch 13, 1937, November 8, 1937, January 17, 1939, and
.Tune 30, 1939. These contracts and others executed by the
state's Department of Public ·works provided, among other
things, for the performance of certain tasks by the state
agencies and approval of the Bureau's planning by the
Authority. The first cooperative contract with the Authority
contained a special provision as follows: "It is contemplated
that at the earliest practicable date a contract will be entered
into between the United States and the Water Project Authority, providing for, but not limited to: (a) The operation
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and maintenance by the authority of useful units of the
project, upon presenting assurance of payment satisfactory
to the United States of the cost thereof. (b) Appropriate
payment by the authority to the United States for expendihues in construction of the project.'' In the second and
third supplemental contracts the special provision was restated in about the same terms. On February 15, 1939, the
g·overnor of the state addressed a letter to the Secretary of
the Interior in which he suggested that a contract be entered
into immediately providing for the administration, operation
and maintenance of the project by the Authority, and for
the repayment of the reimbursable costs of the project by
the Authority to the United States. In answer thereto the
Secretary of the Interior suggested procedures by which state
agencies might take over certain facilities. No definite developments resulted along this line.
The United States has acquired in its own name rights
to certain domestic waters of the state. 'rhese rights are to
waters which are essential to the success of the Central Valley
Project. No claim is made that such water has been acquired
for any purpose other than for the use and benefit of the
project. The nature of the interest or title which the United
States has acquired is hereinafter referred to. The United
States owns no lands in the Central Valley, and by express
provision the acquisition of water rights in most instances
was for the benefit of the Central Valley Project or units
thereof. The greater portion of water to which the United
States has acquired rights is by assignments from the state's
Director of Finance. (Wat. Code, § 10500 through 10506.)
Four assignments of applieations for the appropriation of
unappropriated water of the Sacramento River, totaling
35,000 second-feet diversion and 12,690,000 acre-feet annual
storage, were made on September 3, 1938. On September 30,
1939, three assignments of applications for the appropriation
of unappropriated water of the San Joaquin River, totaling
9,500 second-feet diversion and 4,420,000 acre-feet annual
storage, were made to the United States. Requests for additional assignments have been made to the Director of Finance
by the United States. The assignments made were in trust
for the use and benefit of the Central Valley Project and
with the necessary reservation that the lando,vners and inhabitants within a watershed area or other area conveniently
supplied by the watershed area are not to be depriYed of
their prior rights to water reasonably required for their
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beneficial needs. (Wat. Code, §§ 11460 and 11463; see Wat.
Code, § 11128, as added in 1951 [Stats. 1951, p. 3216].)
The United States itself, between 1943 and 1952, as original applicant, filed eight applications for the appropriation
of unappropriated vvater totaling 33,810 second-feet diversion
and 2,646,000 acre-feet annnal storage of domestic waters
of the state. In all instances these applications were made
for specific purposes in connection with the Central Vall0y
Project.
The United States has also acquired through contract extensive riparian, appropriative and prescriptive water rights in
the San .Toaqnin Hiv<'r once held by Miller and Lux, Inc.
"\Vater rights in the area involved have been the subject of
considerable litigation. (See United States v. Gerlach Live
Stock Co., 3:39 U.S. 725 [70 S.Ct. 955,94 r~.Ed. 1231]; Eve1·ctt
G. Rank v. Krur; (U.S.Dist.Ct .. 81Juthcrn Dist. IJ[ Ca7if1Jrnia,
Northern Div. l{o. 685-N.D.), 142 F.Supp. 1; Hollister Land
& Cattle Co. v. Kru,c; (U.S.Dist.Court. Sout!lrnt Dist1·ict of
Califm·nia. Nm·thcn1 Diuision, No. 680-N.n.), [Rank v. J(nrg.
90 F.Supp. 773, 806].) It is asserted that the United States
intends to divert some of this water to the Central Valley
Project. By agreement dated May 24, 1939, between the
United States and the Madera Irrigation Distriet, tho United
States acquired assignments of all of the District's applications to appropriate the \Yater of tho San ,J oaqnin River,
grants of the Friant Dam site, portions of the reservoir area
and certain gravel deposits. In addition to the foregoing, the
United States has acquired, or is in the pror.ess of aequiring,
the riparian, appropriative and prescriptive water rights of
hundreds of smaller landowners, all of whom are affeeted by
the construction of units and the diversion of water for the
Central Valley Project.
[5] In view of the foregoing circumstances the trial court
properly refused to eliminate the issue of title from the case.
It is obvious that the attorney general of the state and the
Seeretary of the Interior could not, hy agreement, exclude
from the proceeding the question of title or ownership of
water or foreclose other interested parties from pressing it
as a vital question in the case. There is no itispnte between
any of tlH~ parties appraring in the litigation as to the nature
of that title mHl ii is of great importam:e for upon it depends
the extent to which the state or the Fnit0d States or any party
dealing with the domestic waters of the state may exercise
powers of rontrol.
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State of California or any of
to be the owner of the title
it would neeessarily follow
dominion and eontrol over sueh

would control.
if tlw Fnited States
the State of California or
the
distribution aml
as trustee for the henefieiaries of
of
namely the law of trusts,
The exelnsion of the question of
title from the ease could be
only on the theory that
without
and as a matter of law, the fee simple
unrestricted tiJlr to the water is in the state or in its assignee,
the United
or in the United States other than by assignthe elaims of the land O'\Yners in the District as the beneficiaries of
trust. Such a theory finds no
support in the
case.
A trust relationship has existed at all times here involve(), anrl now
between the State of California and
tl1c wah>r nsc>rs of the
ine1nding the water users of
the plaintiff distriet, as to all waters the control of which
has been
red by the state
appropriation or purchase.
As Rtated it is asserted by
allegations in the
pleadings of an of the
formally appearing as parties
defendnnt
the State of California, and the existence
of such a trust relationship is not drmicrl
the plaintiff district or by any
appraring in the proceeding. It is only
becanse of the position alleged to be asserted by the United
States that it is vested with absolute ownership in and to the
water to be distributed to the lands in the district, and to the
property of the district nscd and usable in the distribution
of water to lands therein, that the question of title has arisen.
The question is also important as bearing on the contention of
the landmvners in the district that the contract would deprive
them of vested rights without due process of law and without
just or any compensation.
In considering the question of the title of the United States
and of the Stnte of California in and to the domestic water
of Hw state and the
limited measure of control
whieh
may cxereisc OYer thrm, it is well to eonsider
eertaiu historiea1
of the W'ater law of this state. And
this may be better nm1erstood by eonsidcring the attitude
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ihe state m their
assumed
contentions for
and unrestrieted title and dominion
to their
lands to the exclusion of the
of the state in administering
the trust
upon it
the water law of the state for
the benefit of other vvater users.
In the
of California the waters of the rivers
in the llOt'thern section,
yyere used for
and hydraulic
the raising of
domestic and kindred purposes. It was
realized
that water in this semiarid
was of utmost importance
to the ·welfare, progress and prosperity of the people of the
state. 'l here were few court decisions on the
having
a ~tatewide significanee prior to the case of Lux v. Ilacmin in
1886 (69 Cal. 255, 454 [4 P. 919, 10 P. 674] ). At that time
section 4468 of the Political Code provided as follows: ''The
eommon law of England, so far as it is not rrpugnant to or
inconsistent with the constitution of the United States, or
the constitution or laws o£ the state of California, shall be the
rule of decision in all the courts of this state.'' This court
took the general language of that dedaration by its four
corners and applied the English common-law doctrine of
riparian rights to the ownership, control and use of the waters
of the rivers and streams of the state. The doctrine was declared to be that the owner o£ real property bordering such a
river or stream had a right coexistent with the same rights
of other landowners on the stream, to the use of its waters
and the flow thereof as it was "wont to do in the course of
nature" unimpaired in quality and undiminished in quantity.
This right was cleelared by this court in Lux v. IIaggin, supra,
69 Cal. 255, to be a right appurtenant to the land, in fact a
part and parcel of the land itself. [6] Under this doctrine
the riparian owner had the right to insist that the full flow of
the stream continue to pass by his land in its natural state
whether he needed the water or not. This riparian right
as so defined was declared by this court to be a property right
which vested in the
owner and as sueh was protected
by the state and federal Constitutions. It could not be limited
or impaired without due process of law and without just compensation. rrhe enforcement of that right as so defined led
to the adoption of the Water Commission Ad of 1913. (Stats.
1913, p. 1012.)
By the provisions of that act it was sought, among other
objectives, to subject the enjoyment of the riparian right to
1
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the rule of reasonable beneficial use. Accordingly it was provided in that act that the use of the waters of the rivers
and streams oE the state on the part of the riparian owners
be limited to the \Yater they could reasonably use for beneficial
purposes and that whatever water remained in the stream flow
would be subject to reasonable use through appropriation or
other methods provided by law. 'l'he substance of what the
Legislature was endeavoring to do was to provide, in the
exercise of its police power, that the riparian owner could
continue to have the right to the benefit and enjoyment of
the waters of the stream both in the present and in the future
insofar as he was able to put it to beneficial use on his own
land but that beyond that he could not insist that the water
flovv by and beyond his land whether he needed it or not.
Nevertheless this court adhered to the doctrine of Lux v.
Haggin and by judicial interpretation made ineffective those
provisions of the "\Vater Commission Act of 1913 designed to
restrict riparian rights to reasonable beneficial use. In Herminghans v. Southern Calif. Edison Co. (1926), 200 CaL 81
[252 P. 607], the court reannounced its adherence to the
ancient doctrine and held in effect that no matter how unreasonable the claim of a riparian owner to the full flow of a
stream might be he had the right to assert it.
Following that decision the Legislature sought to implant
in the Constitution of the state, and there was subsequently
incorporated in that document, the provisions of section 3 of
article XIV, which again declared the policy of the state
"that the general welfare of the state requires that the water
resources of the state be put to beneficial use to the fullest
extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of water be
prevented, and that the conservation of such waters is to be
exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use
thereof in the interest of the people and for the public
welfare .... Hiparian rights in a stream or water course attach to, but to no more than so much of the flow thereof as
may be required or used consistently with this section, for the
purposes for which such lands are, or may be made adaptable,
in view of such reasonable and beneficial uses; provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed as
depriving any riparian owner of the reasonable use of water
of the stream to which his land is riparian under reasonable
methods of diversion and use, or of depriving any appropriator
of water to which he is lawfully entitled.''
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'l'he foregoing amendment to the Constitution as proposed
by the Legislature in 1927 and adopted in November 1928
focused the attention of the courts upon the persistent endeavor of the people of the state, first through the Legislature
in 1913 by the adoption of the Water Commission Act in that
year and then by the constitutional amendment in 1928, to
put into effect the doctrine of reasonable beneficial use. The
obvious purpose of the new constitutional provision was to
invite and urge a judicial declaration that the vested right
of the riparian owner be subjected to that doctrine. Thereafter this court so declared. (Gin Chow v. Santa Barbara
(1933), 217 Cal. 673 [22 P.2d 5]; Peabody v. City of Vallejo
(1935), 2 Cal.2d 351 [40 P.2d 486].) [7] Within the scope
of reasonable beneficial use, vested rights of the riparian owner
continued to attach to his land as a part and parcel of the
land itself, and as such was necessarily protected from unlawful encroachment by both state and federal Constitutions.
The result is that this vested right as now defined may not
be destroyed or infringed upon without due process of law
or without just compensation under either Constitution.
[Sa] No encroachment on the vested rights of riparian
owners is directly involved in this proceeding, but the foregoing observations are pertinent as bearing upon the rights of
the people of the state, both present and prospective, to avail
themselves by appropriation or other lawful means of the right
to the use of waters to which a prior lawful use has not
attached. In this category the waters here sought to be
furnished to and used by the landowners in the district must
be classified. \V e are therefore here directly concerned with
the title, distribution and use of water which has not heretofore been subjected to beneficial use except as contemplated by
acquisition, by appropriation or otherwise on the part of the
State of California and the United States.
It is thus appPrent that the more recent changes in the
constitutional and decisional la·w of this state had the effect
of making available for beneficial uses by appropriation and
other means great volumes of unappropriated domestic waters
of the state. The nature of the title to the waters here involved is further indicated by the statutory law of this state.
The title to these waters was mentioned at an early date in
the amendment of section 1410 of the Civil Code in 1911
which provided that ''All water or the use of water within
the State of California is the property of the people of the
State of California" subjeet to appropriation and use in the
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m effect was
Commission Aet of 1913
that '' .t'\ll \Vaters
in any natural \Yater
so far as such \Vaters have been
or are
to useful or beneficial purposes, upon,
or in so far as such waters are or may be reasonably needed
for
beneficial purposes npon lands
or otherwise
is
are hereby declared to be
public >vaters of the state of California alld subject to appropriation in aeeordanee with the
of this act.'' ( Stats.
1913, p. 1018.) The same
was carried into the
Water Code in 1943 as section 102.
Seetion 104 of that code
"It is
declared
that the people of the state have a paramount interest in the
use of the water of the State and that the State shall determine what water of the State, surface and underground, can
be converted to public use or controlled for public protection." Section 105 of the same code provides that "It is
hereby declared that the protection of the public interrst in
the development of the water resources of the State is of vital
concern to the people of tl1e State and that the State shall
determine in what way the waters of the state, both surface
and underground, should be developed for the greatest public
benefit." Section 1052 of that code provides that the diversion or use of water other than as authorized
the code is a
trespass and the Department of Public \Vorks, acting through
the State Engineer, may initiate actions in the superior court
to have the trespass enjoined.
[9] It has long been the established law of the state that
an irrigation district is trustee for the landowners within the
district and limited in its trust to receiye and distribute water
to them. (McTchants Nat. Bank v. Escondido hr. Dist., 144
Cal. 329 [77 P. 937] ; Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Collins, 154 Cal. 440,
442 [97 P. 1124] .) In the Merchants Bank case the court
stated: ''But here, the corporation in question is distinguished from ordinary municipal corporations by the fact
that 'the legal title,' only of the property of the corporation is
vested in the district, 'in trust for the uses and purposes set
forth in (the) act'; and that the beneficiaries of the trustwho, upon familiar equitable principles, are to be regarded
as the owners of the property-are the landowners in the
district with whose funds the property has been acquired
( Civ. Code, § 853) ; and in whom, indeed, is vested by the
express provisions of the statute, in eaeh, the right to the
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several use of a definite proportion of the water of the district,
ancl in
in common, the equitable ownership of its waterrights,
ditches, and property generally, as the means
of supplyiug water. (Stats. 1887, pp. 34, 35 §§ 11, 13.) Such
rights as these cannot be distinguished in any way from other
private
and therefore elearly come within the protection
of the
of section 13 of article I of the state Constitution
that 'no person shall be . . . deprived of . . .
property without due process of law,' and of the similar
provision of Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the
constitution of the United States." (See also Allen v. H7tssey,
101 Cal.App.2d 457, 472 [255 P.2d 674] ; Bottoms v. Madera
Irr·. Dist .., 74 Cal.App. 681, 702 [242 P. 100]; Colbunt v.
Wilson, 23 Idaho 337.)
[10] I.1ikewise the state is not the owner of the domestic
water of the state in the sense that it has absolute power and
dominion over it to the exclusion of the rights of those who
have the beneficial interest therein. The title is an equitable
one residing in the water users of the state. The state as an
entity is the holder of the legal title as trustee for the benefit
of the people of the state, all of whom in the last analysis,
are the water users of the state. (See Hall v. Superior Court,
198 Cal. 373, 383 [245 P. 814] : Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Collins,
154 Cal. 440, 442 [97 P. 1124]; JJ1e1·clwnts Nat. Bank v. Escondido Irr. Dist, supra, 144 Cal. 329.) [11] 'ro avail themselves of the right thereto, individually, collectively or in a
corporate capacity, administrative procedures have been established and are set forth in the \Vater Code and related statutory provisions. Compliance with those provisions is necessary in order that the right to use the water may be acquired,
but always consistent 1vith the trust relationship incident
thereto. [12] Occupying such a relationship it would be incompetent for the state to divest itself of the legal title, by
grant, assignment or otherwise, in any way inconsistent with
the rights of the beneficiaries. It would necessarily follow that it would be inconsistent with the trust for the state
to attempt to pass the legal title freed from the trust to any
third party, including the United States. [13] As trustee
the state and its agencies, of which the plaintiff district is
one, are bound faithfully to administer that trust and are
answerable to the courts, in the exercise of thrir traditional
powers in equity, for the proper di~>charge of their stewardship. They must administer it consistently with and not in
violation of the rights of the beneficiaries. (2vf er·chants Nat.
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Bank v. Escondido Irr. Dist., supra, 144 Cal. 329; LindsayStrathmore hr. Dist. v. W1dchumna Water Co., 111 Cal.App.
688, 698 [296 P. 933]; Allen v. lhtssey, 101 Cal.App.2d 457,
467 [225 P.2d 674].) [14] But it is not to say that the statc>
may not in the administration of the trust prescribe or provide for reasonable terms and conditions to which the beneficiaries must conform in order to have the benefit of expenditures made necessary in providing those benefits. 'l'hese may
be provided for by statute or, as here, by contracts when duly
authorized by law.
The trust relationship existing between the state and the
beneficiaries of the trust must therefore be kept in mind in
connection with any transactions between the state or any of
its agencies and outside parties. [15a] It follows that when
an outside party, such as the United States, by contract, legislation or otherwise, steps into the shoes of the state to administer that trust by the development, conservation and distribution of the trust res, it is bound by the same rules of law as
surround and govern the State of California or any other
purveyor of water of the state for the benefit of its water
users. [16] The state may not therefore lawfully dispossess
itself of the title to such water and may not surrender its
control of the same in any way inconsistent with the administration of the trust under which the title is held. The state
by general law may and has in the main prescribed the terms
and conditions under which the several classes of water users
may become secure in their right to the water and use thereof.
[17] The water users of the state whose rights have not
become vested within the classes above mentioned but who
are dependent upon an adequate supply of fresh water for
their existence in the manifold uses to which it may be supplied, have an inchoate right to such uses subject to like
enforcement and equal protection of the law. This right
is necessarily dependent upon compliance with reasonable
rules and regulations attending it and to the circumstances
of each case such as an adequate water supply, the ability of
the supplier to furnish the water, reasonable payment for the
service and perhaps other conditions not necessary to mention
in the conservation and distribution of a water supply in our
complex civilization. This inchoate right of present and
potential water users of the state is a right of which cognizance must be taken in dealing with the general subject
of the water law of the state and in particular with the rights
of landowners and water users within the plaintiff district.
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[18a] It is therefore concluded that the title to the unappropriated domestic waters of the state is in the State of California in trust for the use and benefit of the beneficiaries
of that trust; that the trust character of that title is anchored
in the state by constitutional provisions, by statutes enacted
in furtherance thereof, and by the decisional law of the state;
that the beneficiaries of that trust are the water users of the
state vvho in a general sense constitute all of the people of the
state; that the beneficiaries of the trust relationship whose
rights are here under consideration are those present or
prospeetivc users who individually or in properly classified
groups bring themselves within the orbit of the state law
under which they may be in position to demand benefits without discrimination, and that within that category are the
landowners of the district. It is they who are in position to
avail themselves of the right to beneficial use of the waters to
be purveyed and to demand indiscriminate service. There is
nothing in the foregoing declaration which interjects anything
new into the water law of the state. It is but a recognition
and redeclaration of existing fundamental concepts of this
phase of our law.
It is well to consider at this point the federal law relating
to the nature of the water rights acquired by the United
States and affecting the rights of the land owners of the
district thereunder. The Reclamation Act of 1902 (32 Stats.
388, 43 U.S.C. § 391) is the basic federal enactment on that
subject. Under that law and subsequent laws in aid thereof,
the Bureau of Reclamation is assuming to administer water
through the Central Valley Project. Section 8 of the Act
of 1902 provides: '' 'rhat nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affeet or to in any way
interfere with the laws of any state or territory relating to
the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used
in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder and the
Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this
Act shall proceed in conformity with such laws, and nothing
herein shall in any way affect any right of any state or of the
Federal Government or of any landowner, appropriator, or
user of water in, to, or from any interstate stream or of
waters thereof; provided, that the right to the use of water
acquired under tho provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant
to the land irrigated and beneficial use shall be the basis, the
measure, and the limit of the right." The meaning and intent
of section 8 of the Reclamation Act as it specifically applies
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to the waters involved in the Central
has been
stated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Gerlach Livestock, Go., supra, 339 U.S. 725. .At pages 734-735 the court
said : ''Congress proceeded on the basis of full recognition of
water rights having valid existence under state law. By its
command that the provisions of the reclamation law should
govern the construction, operation and maintenance of the
several construction projects, Congress directed the Secretary
of Interior to proceed in conformity with state laws, giving
full recognition to every right vested under these laws. Of.
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 295 U.S. 40,43
L.Bd. 1289, 1291, 55
S.Ct. 568] ; California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Pm·tland
Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 164 [79 L.Ed. 1356, 1364, 55 S.Ct.
725]; Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 614 [89 L.Ed.
1815, 1829, 1830, 65 S.Ct. 1332] ; Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Corn.,
302 U.S. 186 [82 L.Ed. 187, 58 S.Ct. 283] . . . . We think it
clear that throughout conception, enactment and subsequent
administration of the plan, Congress has recognized the property status of water rights vested unc\er California law. The
governing water law of California is now derived from a 1928
amendment to its Constitution . . . '' (Art. XIV, § 1) " ...
to which,'' as the Supreme Court in the Gerlach ease said,
"the Federal Reclamation .Act defers." (See also United
States v. Rio Gmnde Dam & I1·r. Go., 174 U.S. 690 [19 S.Ct.
770, 43 L.Ed. 1136] ; State of Oonnectie1d v. Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 [51 S.Ct. 286, 75 L.Ed. 602] .)
[19] Thus the federal government both by legislation and
court decision has recognized that the law of this state is
determinative of rights to water in this state. This court also
so held in Peabody v. City of Valle.io, 2 Cal.2d 351, at page
366 [40 P.2d 486].
[20a] We therefore feel free to declare that in all transactions between the United States and the State of California or
its agencies such as the plaintiff district, the parties are
dealing with trust property held by the state or by those who
have acquired rights to it from the state or otherwise for the
benefit of the real owners thereof. They are the present and
prospective water users of the state who may become entitled
thereto under the laws of the state. ·whatever interest or title
the United States has acquired to water by appropriation,
assignment or by other means of acquisition in furtherance of
the execution of its trust relationship with the water users
of the state is necessarily subject to the limitations of title
herein determined.
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It is to be observed that we are not here dealing with all
of the problems incident to the relationship of the state and
its agencies and the federal government in the construction,
maintenance, control and operation of the works for the distribution and use of the domestie waters of the state. We are
not here conrerned with the ownership and control of interstate \Vaters or any other waters coming within well recognized federal control. (Sec Ji'edemZ Power Corn. v. State of
Oregon
1955), 349 U.S. 435 [75 S.Ct. 832, 99 L.Ed.
1215] . ) \V e are not concerned with problems attending the
title, sale, distribution and use of water in the development of
government 0\Vned land for there are no federally owned irrigable lands within the plaintiff district. Nor are we concerned
with questions relating to the sale and distribution of water
by a privately owned public utility, nor with the distribution
and sale of electrical energy developed through or by means
Gf storage facilities constructed by the State of California or
by the United States or both. vVe are here concerned only
with questions of the title, sale and distribution of intrastate
or domestic waters and with the title to the distributing system
and facilities acquired for the specific purpose of irrigating
the lands within the plaintiff district.
vVe now turn to the provisions of the contract in controversy. Considered in connection with the legislation surrounding it, both federal and state, the contract is an instrument
which, from the standpoint first of its fiscal provisions, provides in Part B for the construction by the United States of a
distributing system within the district for a specified consideration payable to the United States in 40 equal annual
installments; and in Part A to furnish to the district and
by it to the owners of irrigable lands within the district a
supplementary supply of domestic waters of the state developed through the construction and operation of the Central
Valley Project at a price per acre foot payable annually. The
concept of repayment to the United States for its costs is the
unmistakable theme throughout the entire transaction.
[21a] In entering into -the contract the parties are dealing
within statutory authorization but at arm's length. It is not
oversimplification to state that the relationship of the parties
so far as constrnrtion work is concerned is that of debtor
and creditor, for it is clear beyond question that they and
the law under which thc•y are operating contemplate that when
the money expended by the United States has been repaid by
the r1istriet or on its behalf. the district is entitled to an
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acquittance and will thereby become the owner of the distribution system and all of the property used and useful in the
maintenance and operation thereof free and clear of any claims
of others, to the same extent as if the district had constructed
the distributing system itself with its own funds and had thus
become the owner in trust for the water users within the
district. [22] As stated it is certainly true that it was
within the power of the district under the laws of this state
to do in the first instance all that the United States is obligating itself to do under the contract with reference to the construction of a distributing system. The district was authorized
to obtain funds for that purpose by borrowing from the United
States with or without the issuance of irrigation district bonds
(Wat. Code, §§ 23280-23289) and it could contract for the
payment for water distributed to it by or through an outside
source at a fixed point of delivery upon the payment of the
charges agreed upon from funds of its own, if available. (Wat.
Code, § 22228.) In essence, therefore, we have here one party
agreeing to provide the funds for construction work and undertaking to furnish water at a definite delivery point, and
the other party agreeing to accept the water at that point with
payment therefor at a fixed rate and repayment of the construction charges in installments within 40 years, coupled with
what appears to be all sufficient assurances of security in the
event of nonpayment. \Vithin the compass of those provisions
there can be no doubt of the right and power of the parties
to lawfully contract.
Included in the assurance of payment according to the
contract are obligations on the part of the district to provide
funds for repayment by taxation of the lands within the
district, by assessments against the lands for that purpose
and the fixation of water charges sufficient to provide the
security required by the United States. [23] It is the right
of the United States to demand that assurances of security
for repayment of monies advanced by it be included in the
contract; and provisions to that effect are ine:luded therein.
The contract goes further and provides that upon default
in payments as they become due the United States shall
have the right to take over the operation of the affairs of
the district in order to assure timely and adequate repayment.
[24] Likewise, it is the right and duty of the district to have
included in the contract provisions for adequate clearance
of its obligations to repay, including the designation therein
of the amount expended or to be expended hy the United
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States for the benefit of the district and its landowners, or
to a workable provision therein as to how the amount advanced
by the United States may be ascertained when the time for
final accounting, repayment and acquittance arrives, together
with the designation of a definite time when repayment is
finally due. The present contract does not with certainty set
forth such fiscal matters, particularly as it relates to repayment for the construction of the major storage facilities from
which water will be delivered to the district. Upon repayment
the district would succeed to whatever title to lands, structures
or works acquired by the United States within the district
in aid of its activities on behalf of the district and the landowners within the district, in like manner and to the same extent as an ordinary debtor is entitled to a satisfaction of
record evidencing the payment of his indebtedness. 3 (See
Owl Cr·eek Irr. Dist. v. Bryson, 71 Wyo. 30, at pp. 69-70 [253
P.2d 867, 258 P.2d 220].)
[25] Although the relationship of debtor and creditor is
clearly established on the record, it is not clear in what way
the district and its landowners may become free of indebtedness upon repayment. For example, it is provided in the
contract that the United States may acquire property within
the district in its own name for the purpose of constructing
the distributing system, and that pursuant to an act of Congress authorizing such acquisition of property for the benefit
of the landowners of the district, the United States may
divest itself of ovvnership only in such manner as may be
provided by Congress. Obviously such a provision in the
agreement is contrary to the debtor-creditor relationship existing between the United States and the district. The right
and obligation on the part of the United States would seem
to be to hold the property thus acquired by it in its own name
only until final repayment is made, with the right of the
district to a conveyance thereof not dependent on a future
and necessarily discretionary act of Congress.
However, it is mainly because the contract includes provisions not relating to its fiscal aspects that the defendant
3
In an obvious attempt to correct the uncertainty in contracts entered
into pursuant to existing reclamation law, recent legislation by Congress
has defined in greater detail the allocation of payments for water service
between operation, maintenance and construction costs of reclamation
projects. (Pub. L. No. 643, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (3) (July 2, 1956),
70 U.S. Stat. 483-484 (1956).) Such legislation, of course, was not in
effect at the time the present contract was entered into and the judgment herein entered.
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landowner, the State J~ngineer
Water Resources of the Department of Public
amici curiae are opposing it.
On behalf of the state, the attorney general first directs
his attack upon that portion of the judgment which holds
the 160-acre limitation of the contract void as applied to the
state, to the district and to the owners of irrigable land within
the district. The genesis of the 160-acre limitation is found
in the original Heclamation Act of ,J nne 17, 1902, heretofore
referred to. ( 32 Stats., p. 388.) That act is entitled "An
act appropriating the receipts from the sale and disposal of
public lands in certain States and 'rerritories to the construction of irrigation works for reclamation of arid lands.''
It is relatively a brief enactment. It occupies less than
three pages of the Statutes at I1arge of the 57th Congress.
Section 1 provides that all moneys received from the sale
and disposal of public lands in western states should be set
aside in a special fund known as the ''reclamation fund.''
This fund is to be used in the examination and survey for
and the construction and maintenance of ''irrigation works,
diversion, and development of water for the reclamation of
arid and semi-arid lands in the said States and Territories.''
Subsequent sections provide that the Secretary of the Interior
construct appropriate irrigation works; that he may withdraw
certain public lands from entry, or restore other lands to
public entry, as such lands are required for irrigation works;
"that public lands which it is proposed to irrigate by means
of any contemplated ·works shall be subject to entry only
under the provisions of the homestead laws in tracts of not
less than forty nor more than one hundred and sixty acres'';
that the Secretary may limit the area per entry of such public
lands to be irrigated; that he shall fix the charges "which
shall be made per acre upon the said entries, and upon lands
in private ownership which may be irrigated by the waters
of the said irrigation project"; that no "right to the use of
water for land in private ownership shall be sold for a tract
exceeding one hundred and sixty acres to any one landowner,
and no such sale shall be made to any landowner unless he be
an actual bona fide resident of such land"; that the Secretary
is authorized to use the reclamation fund to accomplish the
purpose of the act; that when repayments required by the act
''are made for the major portion of the lands irrigated from
the waters of any of the works herein provided for, then the
management and operation of such irrigation works shall pass
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' except that ''the
of the reservoirs
and the works necessary
and operation
shall remain in the Government until otherwise provided by
Congress,'' and that the
may
judicial
the lands necessary to carry out the
purpose
It i::;
the
was originally 10
years as
for in section 10 of the ad. It was increased to 20 yc>an; by the Reclamation Act of 1914. (38
Stats.
687.) It was changed by the Second Deficiency
Act of 1924 to an indefinite period determined
the productive pow·er of the land.
Stats. 702.) It was again changed
in 1926 to 40 years by the Interior Department Appropriation
Act of 1927. (44 Stats. 479.)
It is readily observed from the provisions of the Reclamation
Act of 1902 that one of its main purposes was to provide for
the reclamation of vast areas in the 17 western states and territories where title to the land was still in the federal government
as owner, and the development of that land into private ownership was deemed essential to the general welfare in establishing
homes and small farming enterprises in the great western
domain.
As a part of this farsighted plan of the federal government
it was undoubtedly recognized that the desired result could
best be accomplished by limiting the amount of land thus to
be purchased and developed. 'fo justify such a limitation in
the contract in question, the attorney general points to other
federal enactments which it is claimed were designed for
the same purpose and which are claimed to have had the same
effect. Among these enactments arc the Homestead Act of
May 20, 1862 (12 Stats. 392) where it was provided that the
amount of land to be acquired by any one person from the
federal government should not exceed 160 acres. Again on
May 10, 1872, the Mines and Mining Act provided for a
limitation on a mining claim usually running lengthwise on the
vein of ore. (17 Stats. 91.)
Another illustration of a limitation placed by the federal
government on the sale of its publicly owned land is found
in the Desert Land Act of March 3, 1877 ( 19 Stats. 377),
where a limitation of 320 acres was placed on a pnrehasc by
one individual. One of the conditions of purchase of land
under that act was that the entryman or purchaser provide
for the water to reclaim the desert Janel. Another illustration
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is the Timber and Stone Act of June 3, 1878, where a limitation for purchase by an individual was placed at 160 acres
(20 Stats. 89).
[26a] Further research would probably disclose other illustrations, but sufficient haye been noted to demonstrate that the
federal government in all of such instances has exercised its
power as the owner of the land to be offered for sale. No
limitation on its po'.ver to sell and convey its own lands existed
or could properly be asserted. The United States was the
owner of the fee with all of the rights of proprietorship. It
could sell or refuse to sell as it pleased. It could and often
did withdraw such lands from entry or sale. As proprietor
it could part with its lands under such terms and conditions
of sale as it saw fit, including a limitation on acreage, price,
term of payment, and otherwise. However, in its activities as
the owner and grantor it controlled the limitation only as to
the first purchasers. It is common knowledge that after the
title passed to the buyer, the land then was subject to resale to
grantees either private or corporate within the ordinary channels of purchase and sale in the field of private property
acquisition and ownership. The buyer was then in position
to sell to vd10m he pleased, or accumulate properties similarly
purchased by others so that his total acreage might far exceed
the original statutory acreage limitation.
\1\f e attribute no merit to argument on bel1alf of the respondents that the 160-acre limitation was conceived as a socialistic
scheme to divide up private property for the benefit of the
many at the expense of "larger landowners." It may not be
denied that the 160-acre limitation originally had a social
objective. It was designed to encourage home seekers to
obtain and develop land ovmed by the federal government
in the undeveloped western states and territories. The plan
sought to arouse the interest of as many settlers as possible
and to prevent, so far as could lawfully be done, the accumulation of larg-e tracts of land h~T single individuals. This the
government, as sole owner, could do as it pleased, without let
or hindrance.
Contrasted with the social objective of a land limitation
in furtherance of the plan to encourage individuals as home
seekers to purchase government lands and to initiate and
increase the productivity of undeveloped public lands was the
objective of the federal government in another field. That
was in the grant to corporations seeking to provide transcontinental transportation of alternate s0ctions of land for 20
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miles on each side of the railroad right of way, as provided for
in various acts of Congress. (See 43 U.S.C. § 881, et seq.)
In a large sense it may be said that those grants had the
social objective of aiding in the increase in population and
development of the vast uninhabited expanse of land owned
by the federal government by affording transportation more
convenient, timely and certain than the covered wagon, the
stage coach and the pony express.
The foregoing objectives and others which might be mentioned were well within the power and control of the federal
government as the owner of the lands to be granted or
otherwise disposed of. But we are not here dealing with social
objectives as such. We are here concerned with the question
of the extent of power, dominion and control which the United
States as a trustee may exercise to deprive beneficiaries of the
trust, namely, the water users of the state and particularly
those in the plaintiff district, of a property right thereunder
or of an inchoate right to the use of water within the district.
Under articles 34, 35, 36, and 37 of the contract, the owner
of land in excess of 160 acres is called a "large land owner,"
and lands in excess of 160 acres are called "excess lands."
If a so-called ''large land owner'' desires to avail himself
of the benefits of project water on any of his lands, he must
select from his larger tract 160 acres of land which is to be
retained by him for the use of water. If the landowner
refuses to make the selection, the members of the board of
directors of the district may do so without his consent. If
they do not, the Secretary of the Interior makes the selection.
Excess lands may not receive water unless prior thereto the
landowner executes a recordable contract between himself and
the United States, whereby he agrees to sell his land in excess
of 160 acres within 10 years at a price to be fixed by an
appraisal board consisting of one appraiser appointed by the
district, one by the Secretary of the Interior, and the two
choosing a third. The landowner has no voice in the appraisal.
The appraised value must be fixed as of the time of the
execution of the recordable agreement and the appraisal cannot
take into consideration any increase in the value of the land
resulting from the supply of water to the land, or from any
other normal increase in value such as might result from an
increase in population, an extraordinary increase in the
productivity of the land or perchance the discovery of oil
or other valuable substances beneath the land. In practice,
according to official government statements, the interpretation
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on contractual
(Section 46, Omnibus
636) similar to the excess land
here is as follows :
"Thus the administrative procedure usually adopted had been
to refuse to deliver water to any lands, excess or non-excess,
until the OYmer of excess land has executed a recordable
contract
to
Survey on Federal Heelamation
Interior [1946], p.
It thus appears that the federal statute as interpreted by
those
it states in effect to the owner of land
within the district susceptible of irrigation : ''If you own
more than 160 acres of land within the District you may not
enjoy one of the incidents of that ownership, namely, the right
to the use of water to which you are entitled on all your
land unless you agree to execute a recordable contract to sell
your land in excess of 160 acres within 10 years at a price
fixed by a board of appraisers in whose selection you have
no voice and at a price to which you do not agree.'' In
addition, no account is taken of the item of possible damage
to the remainder of the land because of a possible severance,
and a possible natural increment in land values.
The duty of both of the contracting parties in the performance of their obligations to the landowners in the district is
set forth in section 22250 of the Water Code. It is there
provided that water distributed by districts shall be '' apportioned ratably to each landowner upon the basis of the ratio
which the last assessment against his land for district purposes
bears to the whole sum assessed in the district'' except as
provided otherwise in the code. No pertinent exceptions
appear.
[27] In addition to his right to due process, the landowner
McCracken is entitled to equal protection of the laws. Discrimination among water users in an irrigation district is
expressly contrary to state law as expressed in the above
quoted section 22250 of the Water Code. [28] The well
established rule on this subject is expressed in City of Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238 at pages 251 and 252 [27 P.
604] as follows: ''. . . although a law is general and constitutional when it applies equally to all persons embraced in a
class founded upon some natural or intrinsic or constitutional
distinction, it is not general or constitutional if it confers
particular privileges or imposes peculiar disabilities or burdensome conditions, in the exercise of a common right, upon a

Jan. 1957]

IvANHOE IRR. DrsT. v.

ALL

PARTms

637

[47 C.2d 597; 306 P.2d 824]

class of persons arbitrarily selected from the general body
of those who stand in precisely the same relation to the subjeet
of the law."
also Matter of
Miller, 162
CaL 687, 698 [124 P. 427] .)
the fact that
the 160-aert> limitation has been a
Law for more
years,
diselose that
of the limitation has been approved
any court
either state or federal, in a
situation where the federal
had no interest in
the lands to be
and
only a trustee's interest
in the waters to be applied. On the other hand the Supreme
Court of
in Owl C1·eck Irr. D1:st. v. Bryson, supra
( 1953), 71
30, beginning at page 67 had the following
to say \Yith reference to the terms of a contract similar as to
the exeess land
to the terms of the present contraet:
'' 'fhe large landowner is specifieally defined in this subdivision
and additional bnrdens imposed upon him. He is forbidden
to rreeive \Yatrr for excess lands until he
in all the
conditions which by this and the two proceeding paragraphs are
upon him . . . . These rontract clauses which
are thus
if applied to owners of private lands are
unreasonable, coerc·ive and devised to deprive them of their
property against their will and without invoking the condemnatory processes which require due compensation to be
made when land is thus taken. These processes embody the
full protective machinery of the law as concerns the private
property owner. These clauses now dravm in question . . .
are subversive of the most elementary rights which our forefathees carried from English law to this country and which
were centuries in their formation . . . . It is quite obvious
if these contract clauses were to be scrutinized under the light
of familiar constitutional limitations they would necessarily
fall."
[29] As to tlw acreage limitation of the contract, it is
therefore concludt'd that the extent of the right of an owner
of real property to the use and enjoyment of his property
right, including the water right which may be attached thereto,
cannot be constitutionally limited on the sole basis of the
amount of property he owns. '!.'his is especially true with
reference to property of the same kind and similarly situated.
If there are any exeeptions to the rule whieh should be applied,
they have not bt'rn poinflc:d out, nor, on reflection, are they
apparent. [30] In other words tlJrre appears to be no basis
founded in reason or mtthority why the owner of a property
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right which is or may be appurtenant to all of his land suitable
for irrigation can be limited in the enjoyment of that right
to 160 acres of his larger holdings. The same right should
attach to his lands in excess of 160 acres and to the excess lands
of all those similarly situated. Thus to deprive members of
the same class of their rights clearly results in an unlawful
discrimination which as said in Pasadena v. Stimson, supra,
91 Cal. 238, is not ''founded upon some natural or intrinsic
or constitutional distinction.'' If a constitutionally authorized
preferment may be extended only to owners of 160 acres of
land or less the question might well be asked whether a like
preferment might not be extended only to owners of more
than 160 acres. The suggestion of either preferment under
the long and well established rule governing classification is
enough to demonstrate its impropriety.
[26b] Notwithstanding the long prevailing provisions of
the original Reclamation Act of 1902 that in the construction
and operation of the reclamation projects under the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior, rights vested under state
law should not be disturbed and should be protected, the
contract in controversy is proposing to transgress those
vested rights. The plaintiff district and the United States,
through its Bureau of Reclamation, are parties to the contract
but as to both the record discloses that they deemed themselves bound by federal law to include these provisions in the
contract. That law is included in the original Reclamation
Act of 1902. (32 Stats. p. 388.) It was reenacted and supplemented by the Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926 as amended.
( 44 Stats. 636, § 46, now U.S. Public Lands Code Anno., 1955,
§ 423e.) Section 46 of that act requires that any contract
with an irrigation district bearing the approval of the Secretary of the Interior shall include the 160-acre limitation.
It is to be noted that this omnibus act covers many subjects
dealing generally with federal reclamation projects where the
intention of the act as show'!l by section 48 was the development of public lands and the rehabilitation of some 20 federal
reclamation projects theretofore existing in many of the
western states. The omnibus act is now included, in material
parts, in Title 43 United States Code, sections 1 to 670, inclusive. This volume is entitled "The Code of the Laws of the
United States of America, 'ritle 43, Public Lands." A survey
of this code shows that its provisions deal generally with the
control, development and sale of public lands of the United
States and section 46 may be deemed to apply to public lands
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alone. If, however, its general language as to the 160-acre
limitation be considered as applicable to the pnrehase by the
United States of unappropriated domestie waters of this state
and, as here, its distribution to irrigation districts and privately owned lands in the state, such a construction would
obviously remove it from consideration as an" applicable" law
governing the execution of the contract in question.
Since its attempted application to the contract is unauthorized under the laws of this state it is necessarily not an
''applicable'' law. Also rarried into the Public Lands Code
of the United States is the provision of the original Reclamation Act of 1902 that state laws remain unaffected by
later enactments. This was recognized by the Supreme Court
in the Gerlach case as late as 1950 where it said that when
Congress directed the Secretary of the Interior to proceed
under the Reclamation Art of 1902 he should not interfere
with the laws of the state " 'relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any
vested right acquired thereunder.' ( 32 Stats. 388, 390.)."
(Unitecl States v. Gm·lach Livestock Co., supra, 339 U.S. 725,
at page 739.) As indicated the federal law could be applicable only on the theory that the United States is the
owner absolute of the domestic waters of the state with the
right to the use thereof freed from any trust relationship on
behalf of the real owners thereof, namely, the water users in
the district. As also indicated such a theory is untenable and
it necessarily follows that the inclusion in the contract of
articles 34, 35, 36 and 37 cannot be legally justified.
[31] Attention has been called to section 23200 of the
\.Vater Code providing that under contracts such as the one in
question water "shall be distributed and apportioned by the
district in accordance with the applicable acts of Congress,
the rules and regulations of the Secretary of the Interior
thereunder, and the provisions of the contract." It is argued
that since the 160-acre limitation is contained in the Federal
Reclamation Act of 1902 the state, the owners of irrigable
lands and the water users are snb.iect to that limitation. But
such is not the case. Section 23200 contemplates that applicable federal law shall apply. As previously noted the 160acre limitation is inapplicable in the present case where the
title to the water to be purveyed is not an nnlimited title in
the United States.
An important question relating to the debter-creditor nature
of the contract is raised by the attorney general and concerns
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as Chief of the Division of
what
said to be the
established water law in this state. \Ve have heretofore declared the debtor-creditor nature of the contract in
In arriving at that conclusion it was considered that applicable
federal law requires that the contract
a
amount
of money to be repaid
the district by installments, within
40 years; that this is an obligation for repayment of the cost
of construction of storage and delivery works, and that the
payments
the district be credited against this obligation.
The attorney general asserts that this is an incorrect construction of the federal Reclamation Project Act of 1939 (53
Stats. 1195, 1196). He states that under present federal
law the repayment of construction costs to the United States
is governed by both section 9 (d) and 9 (e) of that act. Section
9 (d) provides in part:
"No water may be delivered for irrigation of lands in
connection with any new project, new division of a project,
or supplemental works on a project until an organization,
satisfactory in form and powers to the Secretary, has entered
into a repayment contract with the United States, in a form
satisfactory to the Secretary, providing among other things
. . . (2) That the part of the construction costs allocated by
the Secretary to irrigation shall be included in a general repayment obligation of the organization . . . (3) That the general
repayment obligation of the organization shall be spread in
annual installments, of the number and amount fixed by the
Secretary, over a period not exceeding forty years, exclusive
of any development period fixed. . . . ''
As section 9 (d) is read in the light of its particular
provisions and of the general law, it is authority for the
terms of Part B of the contract which provides for the repayment of a stipulated sum in installments within 40 years. If
the construction obligations are not paid within the times
specified, the remedies for the enforcement of payment by
assessment, taxation and possibly other means are provided
for in the contract.
Section 9 (e) of the Heclamation Project Act of 1939 provides: "In lieu of entering into a repayment contract pursuant to the provisions of subsection (d) of this section, to
cover that part of the cost of the construction of works connected with water supply and allocated to irrigation, the
Secretary, in his discretion, may enter into short- or long-term
contracts to furnish water for irrigation purposes. Each sub-
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(·ontraet c;hall b(; for ;;w·h peri()(l, not to exeeerl forly years,
and at ~:;ueh ratf•s a~ in the
's jndgnwnt will produce
revenues at le11st snffieie11t to cover an appropriate share of
the aunual ope.ration and mainteuanee cost and an appropriate
share of such fixr>d eharges as the Secretary deems proper, due
eonsideration being given to that part of the cost of construetion of works eonnected with water supply and allocated
to irrigation, and shall reqnire payment of said rates each
year in advarwc of delivery of water for said year. In the
event such contrac~ts are made for furnishing water for irrigation purposes, the eost of any irrigation water distributing
works construeted by the United States in eonneetion with the
new project, new division of a project, or supplemental works
on a projeet, shall be covered by a repayment contract entered
into pursuant to said subsection (d)."
In view of the last sentence of section 9 (e), it is conceded by
the attorney general that Part B of the contract for the
eonstruetion of the physieal works is a repayment contract,
but the question raised is whether the water delivery portions
of the contract (Part A) are invalid because of inferences
whieh may be drawn that the district and landowners therein
are not entitled to water rights which continue beyond the
40-year term of the contract.
(32a] It is contended by the attorney general that the
United States has properly contracted as a water purveyor
under section 9 (e). The State Engineer contends that the
United States improperly assumes to take section 9 (e) as its
authority for an alternate methorl of contracting with the state,
that is, that the United States has construed that section to
mean that, in lieu of a definite contract for repayment within
40 years, the ·united States may waive or avoid the repayment
provisions in regard to its water rights and obligation to supply water to the district and substitute therefor the right to
renew or not to renew the contract as the occasion might
suit its purpose and elect to continue to serve the district
with water but under terms and eonditions which it might
impose in the nature of an utility service, with no power upon
the part of the district as the contracting agency of the state
to prevent it from so doing. It is claimed by the State
Engineer that the United States and particularly the Bureau
of Reclamation and its legal advisers have decided that section
9 (e) contains snch authorization. The record supports that
contention by doeuments and transcripts of hearings before
47 C.2d-21
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Congressional committPrs whieh need not now be set forth at
length.
It is because of this asserted authorization to the Bureau
of Reclamation that the State Engineer is much concerned.
The effect of the validation of this contract would be, impliedly
at least, to approve a procedure by which the United States as
a purveyor of the domestic waters of this state, might continue
indefinitely to by-pass the established law of the state and
procedures thereunder applicable to water services generally.
In furnishing its domestic waters to consumers at a price,
the activities of the United States under its purported construction of section 9 (e) resemble those of a public utility
acting in a proprietary capacity. [33] As above noted, the
Reclamation Act of 1902 provided that: "Nothing in this
act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to
in any way interfere with the laws of any state or territory
relating to the control, appropriation, use or distribution of
water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the
provisions of this act, shall proceed in conformity with such
laws . . . . " It may fairly be said that the foregoing federal
statutory provision remains in full force; that it controls
the operations of the Department of the Interior so far as
federal law is concerned, and that under the controlling state
law, the furnishing of water to consumers by a utility must be
subject to and be in conformity with certain rules and regulations established by or under the authority of the Constitution and the statutes of the state.
[20b] Moreover, as we have already held, whatever title
the United States has to the domestic waters of this state is
limited by the trusteeship under which that title was acquired.
The United States cannot administer the corpus of that trust
except in the manner defined by the terms of the trust, namely,
the applicable water law of this state. The attorney
general argues that in this validation proceeding it is not
necessary to consider what might or might not be contemplated at the termination of the contract, but the water rights
of the landowners in the district, as members of the class
to which the beneficiaries of the declared trust belong, are
present and existing (sec Ickes v. B'o:;c, 300 U.S. 82, 93-94 [57
S.Ct. 412, 81 L.Ed. 525]), and they are entitled to a declaration thereof. ''By directing the Secretary to proceed under
the Reclamation Act of 1902, Congress elected not 'to in any
way interfere with the laws of the State . . . relating to the
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control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in
irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder.' '' (United
States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., supra, 339 U.S. 725.) [34] If
this contract were construed as imposing upon the district and
the landowners therein a burden under which they may suffer
the loss of water rights at the discretion of the United States,
such a construction would be contrary to well established
confltitutional principles and protections.
[35] The nlidity of the eoutraet is Rought to be established
under the Second Validating Act of 1949. ( Stats. 1949, p.
1511.) The attitude of the United States is reflected in the
position of the attorney general to the effect that "any nonconstitutional defects in the contracts under state law" were
cured by the act.
The act became effective on October 1, 1949, which was
90 days after the :final adjournment of the Legislature of that
year. The act "con :firmed, valiclatcd, and declared legally
effective . . . all Acts and proceedings heretofore taken by a
public body under any law, or under color of any law, for
the authorization" of "all instruments evidencing indebtedness of a public body incurred or to be incurred for any
publie purpose. . . . '' The act includes proceedings taken
by ''counties, cities and counties, cities, public districts of
every kind or class'' and some 50 other specifically named
public bodies, including irrigation districts. The attorney
general contends that "this language clearly covers contracts
between irrigation districts and the United States for a water
supply and distribution system construction."
In this connection it appears that at the time the Second
Validating Act of 1949 was passed by the I_jegislature the eontract was not in existence; that it was not approved by the
electors of the district until August 23, 1949, and that it was
not signed until September 23, 1949. [36] It would seem
that validating statutes cover only those transactions or omissions which occur before the Legislature adjourns. Such
acts no doubt serve a useful purpose but as said by Chief
Justice Beatty in Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118
Cal. 160 at pages 194 and 195 [50 P. 277]: "It is to be
regretted . . . that a court should ever feel itself bound by
rules of construction to give effect to statutes which ratify and
confirm by wholesale the acts of municipal or other political
agencies of the state. There is no more reckless or dangerous
species of legislation. It is really legislating with the eyes
shut, and . . . should . . . be closely scrutinized and strictly
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considered in order to prevent as far as possible the evils
which they involve . . . . "
If the position of the attorney general be sustained, it
would mean that from the time of the final adjournment of the
Legislature on July 2, 1949, to October 1, 1949, every city,
city and county, county, and some 50 specifically named other
public entities or agencies of the state could run full rein
in violation of all of the laws of the state governing and
regulating the making of contracts and the incurring of obligations for the payment of public moneys thereunder not
constitutionally otherwise controlled. Likewise, within that
90-day period they could do anything not yet subjected to
regulation but which could be constitutionally authorized and
this situation would continue during the 90 days after the
final adjournment of the I1egislature. A validation act
assumes legislative consciousness of some act or omission
on the part of the public body affected which is designE)d to
be cured or confirmed. After the final adjournment of the
Legislature and until the effective date of the act (90 days
thereafter) there is no opportunity for the exercise of this
legislative purpose to function. Obviously the only purpose
of postponing the effective date of the act is to permit the
referendum provisions of the law to be made available.
[37] Furthermore if the contract be deemed to include
a utility type contract at the option of the United States,
the Second Validating Act of 1949, or any validating act of
the character of the one here relied upon by the attorney
general, could not render such a contract valid. It is
well settled that the Legislature may ratify only what it could
have theretofore authorized. It is obvious that the
Legislature could not by a general ratifying statute breathe
validity into a contract the effect of which would be to avoid
all of the laws of the state, both constitutional and statutory,
respecting the regulation and control of public utilities in
this state. [38] Assuming the plenary power of the Legislature to enact laws respeeting the regulation and control of
public utilities notwithstanding any provision of the Constitution to the contrary, (Art. 12, § 22, Constitution) nevertheless such legislation must appear on its face to be cognate
and germane to the regulation of public utilities to come within
the Legislature's plenary power. (Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 655, 656 [137 P. 1119, Ann.Cas. 1915C
822, 5 L.R.A.N.S. 652].) [39] There is nothing on the face
of this ratifying statute to indieate in the slightest degree
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that it relate" to the
and eontrol of public utilities.
It is therefore ineffective to circumvent the laws of the state
requiring regulation and t·Otltrol of aetivitiC'S whieb arc iu all
essential respects those of a pnhlic utility. In addition any
validating act could not have confirmed the 160-acre limitation
for the obvious reason that the I,egislature eould not have
theretofore constitutionally authorized it.
[40] The distriet attorney of Ventura County has filed a
brief as amicus euriae on behalf of the Ventura County Flood
Control District. He ealls attention to the deelaration of
the trial eourt in its eonclusions of law to the effect that when
water is furnished by a purveyor of water under the laws of
this state to a landowner for irrigation purposes such owner
thereby acquires a vested right to the continuance of such
serviCe.
Objection to the views of the trial court in this respect
is made on the ground that they do not correctly reflect the
present laws of the state on the subject. 'rhis is the only
cause of concern on the part of counsel for the flood control
district. The background for this objection is disclosed
by the following facts: The Ventura Valley has highly developed urban and interurban industrial and agricultural
areas which have been subjected to a shortage of water
with threatened need of further sufficient supply. To alleviate
this water condition the Ventura County Flood Control
District was organized under chapter 44 of the Statutes of
1943 (p. 168). One storage dam has been constructed and
another is in the course of construction or nearly completed.
'l'he distribution systems have not been completed but water
is stored in the reservoirs. Pending the completion of the
distribution systems the district is furnishing to certain
lands outside of the district some of the stored water under
contracts with the users that when the system within the
district is completed and water made available to landowners
within the district the use of water outside of the district
will terminate. This arrangement was made because of the
dire need of water on lands without the district for even
temporary purposes and perhaps to tide the owners thereof
over to a time when they could develop an additional supply
of water on their own behalf. If this temporary agreement
with the outside land owners is not permitted because of the
declaration of the trial court, increasing amounts of water
now in storage and to be stored in the reservoirs of the
Ventura district will be required to go to waste.
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There IS no law of this state which may properly be
invoked to prevent such a temporary arrangement. The
question is pertinent to the present case because of the fact
that a supplemental water supply has been furnished to
land owners in the Ivanhoe Irrigation District by the United
States for an extensive period pending the negotiations for
a contract such as involved in the present proceeding.
There appear to be early cases to the effect that when a
purveyor of the domestic waters of the state furnishes water
to lands for irrigation purposes, the right of the owner of
the lands to a continuance of the use may not be cut off.
The rules of the earlier cases have in general been modified
by enactments in the \Vater Code of the state with reference
to the use of water as authorized by the Constitution. As
bearing on the right acquired by user in particular cases,
including the rights of landowners in connection with the
administration of the water law of the state the Legislature
has provided in division 11 (irrigation districts), part 5,
chapter 2, article 2 (water distribution, § 22262) as follows:
"No right in any water or water right owned by the district
shall be acquired by use permitted under this article." (Stats.
1943, p. 1897, based on Stats. 1897, p. 259.) An identical
provision is contained in that portion of the code pertaining
to Water Districts (Wat. Code, § 35428). Other code provisions provide authority for entities supplying public water
to serve some of their territories with water and not serve
others in the event of shortages. (Wat. Code, §§ 22252.1,
35435; Pub. Util. Code, §§ 2708, 2710, 2711.)
[41] It is claimed that article 26 of the contract purports
to condition the delivery of water to a landowner otherwise
entitled to delivery, upon the payment by him of any assessment levied although it has been judicially declared to be a
void assessment. It seems unusual that a party should, except under compulsion, contract to pay an assessment declared to be void by a court of competent jurisdiction. But
when taken as a reasonable and additional assurance of
reimbursements to the United States for expenditures incurred on behalf of the district and to cover operating expenses
in furnishing water to the district, it may be deemed a legitimate subject of contract.
Questions are raised as to the sufficiency of the notice of
election whereby the electors of the district were called upon
to approve the proposed contract, and the trial court con-
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eluded that the contract was invalid for lack of proper notice.
(Wat. Code, § 23223.) These questions need not be determined in this case for the reason that upon submission
of any further proposed contract they need not recur.
The trial court in its findings of fact and conclusions of
law declared the contract to be invalid on numerous additional grounds not carried into the judgment. Conclusions
that the contract is uncertain, lacks mutuality, improperly
delegates powers to the Secretary of the Interior, improperly
prevents changes in the boundaries of the district, provides
unreasonable security measures to the United States and
other conclusions not necessary to the judgment are insufficiently supported when considered in connection with the
views herein expressed as to the terms under which the parties
may properly contract.
In accordance with the foregoing it is concluded :
(1) That the plaintiff is an irrigation district duly
organized, existing and operating as such under the laws of
this state.
[Sb, 18b] (2) That the title to the unappropriated domestic waters of the state is in the State of California in trust for
the water users of the state as beneficiaries and such waters
are subject to appropriation under the laws of the state.
[15b] (3) That the United States as assignee of appropriative rights, as original appropriator thereof, and in the
acquisition of other rights for the same purpose stands in the
same relation to such beneficial owners as does the state,
namely, as trustee for such beneficial owners and is answerable for the faithful performance of that trust.
[26c] ( 4) That in distributing the water contracted to
be delivered to the District the United States does so as a
purveyor of water at a price for the benefit of the water
users of the District.
(5) That in so delivering the water to the District
it is not competent for the United States or the District,
either or both, to discriminate against the present or potential water users in the District on the basis of the amount
of land owned by them, and that the 160-acre limitation contained in the original Reclamation Act is inapplicable to the
subject matter of the contract and is improperly contained
therein.
[2lb] ( 6) 'fhat insofar as the contract provides for the
construction of works for the storage and distribution of
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water to and by the district, the relationship of the parties
is that of contractor and contractee. Upon the completion
of the construction work the district is obligated under the
law to pay for the same within 40 years in equal annual
installments. Upon the completion of . such payments the
district is entitled to ownership of the works and property
of the storage and distribution system free from any claims
of the United States.
[32b] (7) That insofar as the contract provides for furnishing water to the district at a price the United States in acting as a purveyor of domestic waters of the state to the district,
under federal law, is bound to observe and comply with the
laws of the state with reference to the rights which are vested
in the water users being served or entitled to be served. In
this respect neither the state nor any of its agencies may
contract or otherwise provide that the distribution of water
to those for whose benefit the right to the water was acquired
may be arbitrarily discontinued.
The judgment is affirmed.
Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
GIBSON, C. J.-I dissent.
The holding of the majority opinion, which invalidates the
160-acre water limitation and other vital provisions of the
contract between Ivanhoe Irrigation District and the United
States Government, undermines the very foundation of federal reclamation policy and threatens to end the flow of
federal funds into this state for reclamation and irrigation
purposes at a time when the need for rapid development of
our water resources is most critical. In reaching its conclusion
the majority ignores the Irrigation District Federal Cooperation Law of this state, relies on a statutory provision relating
to the apportionment of water by districts which is inapplicable to water from a federal project, and enunciates a trust
theory with respect to the ownership of water which has no
basis in existing law, is unsound in principle, and will prove
a serious obstacle in the resolution of state-wide problems
involving the distribution and utilization of available water
supplies for domestic and industrial purposes, the irrigation
of land, and the production of power.
The Central Valley Project, which is now nearing completion, is a federal undertaking being built under the provisions
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of the national reclamation laws. Since the passage of the
Pederal Heelamation A.ct in 1902, the federal statutes have
a limit on the amount of irrigation water from federal projeets which \Yill be sold to any one landowner, namely,
sufficient water to meet the needs of 160 acres of land. In
California, by reason of our community property law, the
limitation has been interpreted as allowing a man and wife
to
sufficient water to supply 320 acres. (Graham, "The
Ccntml Yallcy Project: Resmwce Development of a Natural
Bas1:n" ( 1950), 38 Cal.L.Hev. 588, 608-611.) The restriction
is not a limit on the amount of land a person may own. There
is nothing in the governing federal statute, section 46 of the
Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926, which compels an individual who owns more than 160 acres to sell any of his land
as a condition to receiving water sufficient for 160 acres.
( 44 U.S. Stat. 649, 43 U.S.C.A. § 423e (Supp. 1955) .) He
may retain all his land, receiving federal project water for
the first 160 acres and irrigating the remainder with whatever
other water may be available. It is only where he elects to
delivery of federal project water for the portion of
his land in excess of 160 acres that he may be compelled to
dispose of the excess land within a period of time fixed by
the Secretary of the Interior. (See Graham, op. cit., 38 Cal.
L.Rev. at pp. 606-608.)
'rhe suggestion that the limitation may not have been
intended to apply to lands held in private ownership prior to
eonstruction of a reclamation project flies in the face of
specific language in the statute of 1902, which provides that
uo right to the use of water ''for land in private ownership
shall be sold for a tract exceeding 160 acres to any one landowner . . . . " (32 U.S. Stat. 389, 43 U.S.C.A. § 431.) Subsequent enactments contain similar provisions making specific
reference to lands in private ownership. (36 U.S Stat. 926
(1911), 43 U.S.C.A. § 524; 37 U.S. Stat. 266 (1912), 43
lT.S.C.A. § 544; 38 U.S. Stat. 689 (1914), 43 U.S.C.A. § 418;
44 U.S. Stat. 649-650 (1926), 43 U.S.C.A. § 423e (Supp.
1955) ; see Graham, op. cit., 38 Cal.L.Rev. at p. 616.) The
Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926 expressly requires that contracts between the federal government and irrigation districts
shall contain the acreage limitation as a condition to delivery
of water from a federal project. ( 44 U.S. Stat. 649-650, 43
U.S.C.A. § 423e (Supp. 1955).) Thus the water limitation
in the Ivanhoe contract follows the requirement of the federal
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statute, and, unle~s the ~tatutory limitation may properly be
construed a~ inapplieable in California, or is declared uneonstitutional, or is removed from the law by eongressional aetion,
the representative~ of the federal government would have no
power to negotiate a new eontraet without it.
Loeal irrigation distriets are authorized by state law to
enter into eontracts with the federal government for a water
supply on tenns required or authorized by federal law. Direct
authority for the action of the Ivanhoe district is found in the
California vVater Code whieh, since its adoption in 1943, has
eontained a chapter known as the Irrigation District Federal
Cooperation Law ( § 23175 et seq.), most provisions of which
are based on statutes originally enacted in 1917 (Stats. 1917,
eh. 160). Section 23195 provides: "Districts may cooperate
and contract with the United States under the Federal
Heelamation Act of June 17, 1902, and all acts amendatory
thereof or supplementary thereto or any other act of Congress
heretofore or hereafter enacted permitting cooperation." No
delegation of legislative power is involved, and the state law
elearly authorizes a contract which includes the provisions
of the :F'ederal Omnibus Adjustment Aet of 1926. Section
23196 of the Water Code authorizes districts to contract with
the United States for a water supply and for acquisition and
operation of works for irrigation.
vVith respect to the delivery, distribution, and apportionment of water among irrigators, section 23197 provides that
district contracts with the federal government may include
provisions for " (a) Delivery and distribution of water for
the land in the district under the ~·elevant acts of Congress
.and the rules and regulations established thereunder. . . , ''
and section 23200 provides, ''All water, the right to the use
of whieh is acquired by a district under any contract with
the United States shall be distr·ibuted and apportioned by the
d-istrict in accordance with the applicable acts of Congress,
the rules and regu.lations of the Secretary of the Interior
thereunder, and the provisions of the contract, ... " (Italics
added.)
The majority takes the position that sections 23197 and
23200 must be construed as referring only to federal acts
which do not conflict with state law and that the 160-acre
limitation in the contract is invalid because it assertedly conflicts with section 22250 of the state Water Code which provides that water shall be apportioned ratably to each landowner on the basis of the last assessment against his land for

Jan.1957]

IvANHOE IRR. DisT. v. ALL PARTIES

651

147 C.2d 597; 306 P.2d 824]

district purposes. 1 The only reasonable interpretation of sections 23197 and 23200 is that the Legislature intended to
authorize irrigation districts to enter into contracts with regard to the delivery, distribution, and apportionment of federal project water under the terms imposed by Congress as
a condition to participation of the federal government in such
contracts. The substance of section 22250 is contained in
statutes enacted long before there was any water limitation
in the federal reclamation law and before this state adopted
the Irrigation District Federal Cooperation Law, the express
purpose of which was to enable irrigation districts to secure
the assistance of the United States Government in obtaining
a water supply. Moreover, section 22250 is a general provision governing the distribution of irrigation water by districts,
and it is obviously qualified by the more recent provisions in
sections 23197 and 23200 which relate specifically to the
distribution and apportionment of federal project water under
contracts between irrigation districts and the United States.
As we have seen, sections 23197 and 23200 authorize the
acquisition of a supply of water from the United States and
direct that such water shall be distributed and apportioned
by the district in accordance with the applicable acts of Congress, the rules established thereunder, and the provisions
of the contracts. It follows that section 22250 cannot prevail
here in the face of the water limitation which is required by
the federal statute and which is thus authorized by sections
23197 and 23200.
It should also be noted in considering the effect of section
22250 that the statute should not be interpreted as fixing
the exclusive method of apportioning available water among
landowners in all irrigation districts in the state. Section
22250 appears in part 5 of division 11 of the Water Code
relating to the powers and purposes of irrigation districts,
and, to be at all intelligible, it must be read in connection
with the provisions in part 5 and elsewhere relating to the
financing by a district of the cost of constructing, maintaining
and operating an irrigation system. Aside from incidental
1
Section 222i50 of the Water Code provides: ''All water distributed
by districts for irrigation purposes shall except when otherwise provided in this article he apportioned ratably to each landowner upon the
basis of the ratio which the last assessment against his land for district
purposes bears to the whole sum assessed in the district for district purposes." The substance of this section was included in the statutes of
1887, page 34, section 11. It also appears in the statutes of 1897, page
259, section 18.
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sources of revenue, there are two major methods of financing
a district irrigation system under the ·water Code: (
ad
valorem assessments on land in the district ( § 25500 et seq.;
see § 25503); and (2) tolls charged to district irrigators for
water delivered and other services ( § 22280 et seq). ·where
all district costs are financed by levying ad valorem assessments on district land, the formula for water apportionment
set out in section 222:50 is dearly applieable and, when eouplccl
with a provision such as section 22251 authorizing a landowner to assign any or all water apportioned to him, is reasonable. (Fallbrook hr. Dist. v. Bradley (1896), 164 U.S. 112,
162-163 [17 S.Ct. 56, 64, 41 L.Ed. 369].) But, once an irrigation sy:stem is in operation and the di:strict, as it may,
finances a share or all of its expenses by means of eharging
rates or tolls to actual water users, it seems clear that the
formula for water apportionment in seetion 22250 is not
intended to apply.
rrhe uncertainties and inequities of the assessed-land-value
formula for water apportionment were discussed in ·willard
v. Glenn-Colusa Irr. Dist. (1927), 201 Cal. 726, 741-743 [258
P. 959], where this court upheld the constitutionality of a
1911 statute providing that, "In lieu (either in part or in
whole) of levying assessments," irrigation districts have the
power to raise all or part of the cost of operating and maintaining an irrigation system by means of charging rates or
tolls to actual water consumers. (Cal. Irrig. Dist. Act, §55,
Stats. 1911, p. 516 [now Wat. Code,§ 22280]; see Water Code,
§ 25655.) It was pointed out that the assessed-land-valuation
formula for water apportionment created hardship and uncertainty for owners of land having a relatively low assessed valuation but containing crops which required more water than
the land would be entitled to under the formula for water
apportionment. ''On the other hand,'' states the opinion, ''by
giving to the board of directors [of an irrigation district]
the power to raise the whole or a part of the cost of maintenance by tolls . . . every land owner of the district is
given an opportunity to the extent of the water supply of
the district of securing a definite, certain, and adequate
supply of water for his lands." (201 Cal. at p. 743.) While
the q11estion of water apportionment was not before the court,
the language of the opinion clearly indicates that the formula
for apportionment in section 22250 is not applicable in a
situation where all or part of the district expenses are paid
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hy mean;:; of charging rates or tolls to aetual water users rather
than
levying an ad valorem tax on district land.
Ivanhoe and most of the other irrigation districts in the
state have adopted the practice of defraying costs of maintemmce and operation by means of a combined system of
assessm.:•nts and charging rates or tolls to actual water
users. (See Willar·cl v. Glenn-Colusa Irr. Dist., 201 Cal. at
p. 744; Cal.
. of Pub. \Vorks, Div. \Vater Resources,
Bull. 21 K, "Hr>port on Irrigation Districts of California for
the year
" pp. 8, 22; ibid., Bull. 21P, "Heport on Irrigation Districts in California, 1944-1950," appendix.) The
serviee::; for \rhich tolls and rates may be charged have been
gradually extended. (See W at. Code, § 22280.) Section 25655
provides that revenues derived from such rates or tolls may
be spent for ''district purposes'' generally, and section 25219
authorizes their use to pay principal and interest on construction and refunding bonds. Hence most, if not all, district
expenses may ultimately be financed not by assessments but
by tolls charged to actual water and power consumers (see
Willard v. Glenn-Colusa Irr. Dist., 201 Cal. at pp. 740-741),
and the Legislature could not have intended that the water
apportionment formula in seetion 22250 should be applicable
under such circumstances.
Even if it be assumed, for the sake of argument, that there
is a conflict between seetion 22250 and the water limitation
provisions of the federal statutes, the assertion by the majority
that seetion 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act provides for the
supremacy of state law is untenable. Section 8 provides:
"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as affecting or
intended to affect or in any way interfere with the laws of
any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation,
use or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested
right aequired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior,
in carrying out the provisions of this chapter, shall proceed
in conformity with such laws . . . . " However, as stated in
Nebraska v. Wyoming (1945), 325 U.S. 589, 612, 615 [65 S.Ct.
1332, 89 L.Ed. 1815], seetion 8 will not be construed in every
instance to mean that "where Congress has provided a system
of regulation for federal projects it must give way before an
inconsistent state system." (Emphasis added.) In the present case it is conceded that all water rights necessary to construction of the irrigation system have been acquired by the
federal government in strict compliance with state law. The
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question before us is how a future supply of water from the
completed federal project, water not hitherto available, shall
be apportioned among district landowners. The 160-acre
water limitation is clearly part of a "system of regulation"
for federal projects within the meaning of the language quoted
above from Nebraska v. Wyoming and thus appears to fall in
that area where section 8 does not compel federal law to give
way before inconsistent state legislation; hence, if there is any
state-recognized vested right which, in fact, conflicts with the
acreage limitation, that right may be taken and compensated
for by the federal government under its power of eminent
domain. (See Unitecl States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339
U.S. 725, 733, 739 [70 S.Ct. 955, 94 L.Ed. 1231] ; 32 U.S.
Stat. 389, 43 U.S.C.A. § 421 (Supp. 1955); Rivers and Harbors Act of 1937, § 2, 50 U.S. Stat. 844, 850.) rrhe question
of compensation for loss or threatened invasion of a vested
water right is not before us.
In holding the Ivanhoe contract invalid, the majority opinion invokes the aid of a "trust" theory assertedly based on
general state law. The theory is that unappropriated domestic
water is owned by the state in trust for water users and that
the federal government can acquire no title to appropriative
water rights free of such trust. For reasons hereinafter
stated, it is my opinion that the trust theory is erroneous,
but, if it be assumed that such a trust exists, it is clear, as
indicated above, that there is nothing in the federal water
limitation which conflicts with state law, state water policy,
or the best interests of the water users of the state, hence
nothing which can be held to constitute a breach of trust.
There is no legal basis for the trust theory developed by
the majority opinion. The Constitution and statutes of California reserve to the state considerable control over the use
to which domestic water shall be put but contain nothing
which creates a trust as to such waters. Section 3 of article
XIV of the Constitution provides in substance that the water
resources of the state must not be wasted, that conservation
of such waters is to be exercised with a view to the reasonable
and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people and for
the public welfare, and that the right to the use or flow of
water from any natural stream or water course in the state
is limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for
the beneficial use to be served. Sections 104 and 105 of the
\Vater Code provide, in effect, that the state may regulate
the use of water in the interest of the people. These and
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other general regulatory provisions apply to all water and
water rights, whether riparian, appropriative or underlying,
and whether privately or publicly owned.
The fact is that no declaration of trust is intended or
effectuated by these general provisions enunciating water
policy and providing for regulation, and they are in no way
inconsistent with the existence of full title to water rights
in the state or in private persons. While the use to which
certain property may be put is controlled by state law, this
does not mean that the owner thereof has something less than
full title. It adds nothing to the strength and effectiveness of
the laws regulating the use of water to say that they give
rise to a trust relationship between the state and water users,
but, to the contrary, such language threatens to confuse the
development of our water law. The very use of the term
"trust" draws with it the problem of applying settled trust
principles to all water rights in the state, or at least to those
acquired by appropriation-a problem which will certainly
be attended by much uncertainty and difficulty.
Let us examine the trust theory as applied to the water
rights involved in the present proceeding. The United States
is acquiring the water rights necessary to completion of the
project by means of (1) assignment of applications for appropriation made by the state, (2) applications for appropriation
made directly by the United States, and (3) purchase and
exchange agreements made by the United States with certain
private owners of riparian rights to divert the flow of the
San Joaquin River. (Graham, op. cit., 38 Cal.L.Rev. 596600.) With regard to the first two, which relate to hitherto
unappropriated water, even if it be assumed that all unappropriated water and water to which an appropriative right
is not fully perfected belongs to the state, the ownership rights
of the state do not differ from its rights in other state-owned
property. Certainly the state has full title to the water and
water rights which belong to it, and the people, acting through
their representatives and within the limits of the Constitution,
may dispose of it as they see fit. There may be occasions when
the state would find it necessary to weigh the interests of
a small group of potential water users against those of a
much larger group, but it is difficult to see how this would be
possible if all water nsers of the state have equal rights as
beneficiaries of the trust, and it would be even more difficult
if, as suggested, the water users of a particular distrirt are
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the sole beneficiaries of a trust in all waters which may ever
be brought into the district. .Application of a trust theory,
in such a situation, would be an obstacle to the development
of a water plan otherwise consistent with the best interests
of a majority of the people. In the absence of any specifie
constitutional or statutory provision establishing a trust, it is
improper for this court to restrict the power of the state
Legislature and the people as a whole by the device of declaring that such a trust relationship exists.
The series of eases beginning with Merchants Nat. Bank of
San Diego v. Escondido Irr. Dist., 144 Cal. 329 [77 P. 937],
which are cited in support of the trust theory, are not in point
because they deal not with the relationship of the state to
domestic waters but rather with the functions of irrigation
districts under statutes which, like section 22437 of the "'vVater
Code, specifically declared that such a district held its property ''in trust'' for the purposes of the district.
Nor is there anything in section 102 of the Water Code
which supports the trust theory. The section reads, ''All
water within the State is the property of the people of the
State, but the right to the use of water may be acquired by
appropriation in the manner provided by law." Nothing in
this language is inconsistent with the view that the state holds
and can convey full and complete title to the water rights
which it owns. And it is settled that the broad statement,
''.All water within the State is the property of the people of
the State,'' has no application to privately owned water or
water rights. (San Bernardino v. Riverside, 186 Cal. 7, 29-30
[198 P. 7841.) The court in the San Bernardino case said
with respect to this broad language, "Taken literally, this
would include all water in the state privately owned and that
pertaining to lands of the United States, as well as that owned
by the state. It should not require discussion or authority to
demonstrate that the state cannot in this manner take private property for public use . . . . The constitution expressly
forbids it. (Art. I, § 14.) The water that pertained to or
was contained in the lands of the state was already the property of the people when this [statute] was adopted. The
statute was without effect on any other property." (186 Cal.
7, at pp. 29-30.)
With respect to the third method by which the United
States is acquiring water rights, i.e., through purchase and
exehange agreements made with private owners of riparian
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rights, it is clear that under the well-recognized
set forth above such rights are not subject to a trust.
\Ve have been cited to no case which holds that the state
or prh'ate persons cannot hold full and complete title to water
or water rights, and the constitutional and
provisions regulating the use of water which are relied on
the
majority opinion do not, even by remote implication, require
or justify the application of a trust theory in this field. Under
existing law water may be used only for beneficial purposes,
and all property of the state is held for the benefit of the
people and is subject to use and disposition only in their
best interest. The application of formal trnst principles in
this field thus appears to be totally unwarranted. Monover,
the ramifications of the trust theory as applied by the majority
are infinite, technical and unpredietable and, as pointed out
above, may prove to be a handicap in the future development
of the water resources of this state.
'l'he water rights acquired by the United States must, of
course, be used in accordance with federal law. Under section 8 of the Reclamation Act appropriations may be made
by the federal government, not for its own use, but only for
the use of landowners; the right to the use of water aequired
under the act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and
benefieial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit
of the right. (Nebraska v. Wyoming (1945), 325 U.S. 589,
614-615 [65 S.Ct. 1332, 89 L.Ed. 1815].)
The suggestion that the 160-acre limitation violates principles of equal proteetion and due procesR is without merit.
This court cannot, of course, properly enter into a discussion
of the wisdom of the limitation or the desirability of having
it apply to the farming economy of the central valley in California. These are matters for Congress to determine. The
limitation has remained in the federal reclamation law for
over 50 years and has survived numerous efforts to eliminate
it. 2 (Taylor, "The Excess Land Law: Execution of a Public
Policy" (1955), 64 Yale L.J. 477, 502-503.) It seems clear
that the limitation upon the amount of water from a federal
irrigation project to be sold to any one landowner creates a
reasonable classification in furtherance of the purposes of
2
In three instances Congress speci:fically exempted certain reclamation
projects in Colorado, Nevada and California from the limitation, but
all attempts to obtain such an exemption for the Central Valley Project
have failed. (Taylor, op. cit., at pp. G02-i>Oil. \
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the federal legislation. The federal government does not propose to recover the entire cost of building the Central Valley
Project, and its construction and operation will result in a
considerable subsidy to irrigators. 3 They will have the long
term use of federal money necessary to finance the construction of dams, storage and distribution systems for their benefit, free of interest, and will bear the ultimate cost of only
a small part of the capital outlay allocated to irrigation construction. The water limitation was intended to prevent use
of the reclamation service for speculative purposes, and it
insures that the irrigators' subsidy and other benefits of
federal irrigation projects will not go in disproportionate
share to a few large landowners but will be confined to holders
of moderate-size tracts of land sufficient to maintain one
family; its purpose, in other words, is to distribute the government benefits in accordance with the greatest good for the
greatest number of individuals. (Graham, op. cit., 38 Cal.
L.Rev. at 617.) .Any vested rights of the landowners which
are taken by the federal government must, of course, be compensated for, but the problems of compensation are not within
the issues of this proceeding. It should be noted in this connection that none of the landowners in the district has riparian
rights or perfected appropriative rights to the waters involved
here and that the land of Courtney McCracken, the individual defendant who is opposing confirmation of the contract, is located about 100 miles from the river from which
such waters come.
3
That portion of costs allocated to navigation and flood control
(approximately 12 per cent of total estimated cost) is nonreimbursable.
Of the costs for which the United States will be reimbursed, expenditures
allocated to irrigation represent approximately 63 per cent of the total.
Of the remainder, costs allocated to municipal and industrial water
supply represent approximately 3 per cent of total reimbursable cost;
that allocated to power development represents 33 per cent. (See note,
38 Cal.L.Rev. 728, 730, citing H.R. Doc. No. 146, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
23 (1947) .) Federal money expended for irrigation purposes is advanced
free of interest over long periods of time, and, in the allocation of
repayment obligations under plans formulated by the Bureau of Reclamation, irrigators are scheduled to repay the United States only 17 per
cent of total reimbursable costs or, stated otherwise, approximately
35 per cent of the costs allocated to irrigation. (Harding, ''Background
of California Water g. Power Problems" (1950), 38 Cal.L.Rev. 547, 564.)
The difference is proposed to be made up by users of project power and
municipal and industrial water who are scheduled to pay rates designed
to return approximately 82 per cent of total reimbursable cost. (Harding,
op. cit., 38 Cal.L.Rev. at 564; Graham, op. cit., 38 Cal.L.Rev. at 622;
Maass, "Administering the C.V.P." (1900), 3il Cal.L.Rev. 666, 672;
Note, 38 Cal.L.Rev. 728, 730.)
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\V e turn now to a consideration of the effect of the provisions in the Ivanhoe contract relating to the method by which
the district irrigators shall reimburse the federal government
for a part of the costs incurred in construction of the federal
project. As noted earlier, the federal government proposes
to recover from irrigators only a portion of the construction
costs allocated to irrigation, and the federal reclamation laws
now provide two methods by which the United States may
recover this amount. Under section 9 (d) of the Reclamation
Project Ad of 1939, based on provisions contained in earlier
reclamation laws, an organization of irrigators and the federal
government may enter into a repayment contract by the terms
of which the government agrees to supply water at a rate to
be fixed by the Secretary of the Interior, and the local organization agrees to repay a fixed sum representing its share
of total construction costs allocated to irrigation. 'l'he Secretary fixes the sum of the organization's repayment obligation
and sets the amount and number of annual installments sufficient to repay the sum within 40 years. It was found that
this method lacked flexibility (see note, 38 Cal.L.Rev. 739,
740-741; Maass, op. cit., 38 Cal.IJ.Rev. 666, 672), and, in
1939, section 9 (e) of the Reclamation Project Act created an
alternative method for repayment by irrigators of the costs
incurred by the federal government in constructing project
units other than water distribution works located inside the
district.4 Under contraets authorized by section 9 (e) there
is no agreement by the irrigators to pay a definite sum within
40 years to cover costs of project construction but, instead, the
•section 9 (e) of the Reclamation Project Act provides as follows:
''In lieu of entering into a repayment contract pursuant to the provisions of subsection (d) of this section to cowr that part of the cost of
the construction of works connected with water supply and allocated to
irrigation, the Secretary, in his discretion, may enter into either shortor long-term contracts to furnish water for irrigation purposes. Each
such contract shall be for such period, not to exceed forty years, and
at such rates as in the Secretary's judgment wm produce revenues at
least sufficient to cover an appropriate share of the annual operation
and maintenanee cost and an appropriate share of such fixed eharges as
the Seeretary deems proper, due consideration being given to that part
of the cost of construction of works connected with water supply and
allocated to irrigation; and shall require payment of said rates each
year in advance of delivery of water for said year. In the event such
contracts are made for furnishing water for irrigation purposes, the costs
of any irrigation water distribution works constructed by the United
States in connection with the new project, new division of a project,
or supplemental works on a project, shall be covered by a repayment
contraet entered into pursuant to said subsection (d)." (53 U.S. Stat.
1193, 61 U.S. Stat. 501, 43 U.S.C.A. § 485h(e) (Supp. 1955).)
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under tshort or long term contraets for
not
40 years, agrees to deliver water to
the local organization at a rate fixed by the Secretary which
is sufficient to include some return to the federal government
on construction costs as well as costs of operation and maintenance.
In the
contract, costs incurred by the federal govermnent in
a water distributing system inside
the Ivanhoe district are covered by a 9 (d) type provision.
The contract does not contain any express provision for
repayment of a share of the costB of conBtructing portions of
the project located outside the district, such as Friant Dam
and other units of the Central Valley Project. It provides
merely that the United States is to furniBh water and the
diBtrict is to pay for it at an acre-foot rate to be fixed annually
by the Secretary, in no event in excess of $3.50 per acre foot.
It is argued that the contract is defective because there is no
specific requirement that a definite portion of that rate shall
be allocated to repayment of the district's share of the costs
of constructing project facilities outside the district. However, the applicable provisions of section 9 (e) must be read
into the contract, and they provide that the water rate fixed
the Secretary shall be such as will produce revenue sufficient to cover an appropriate share of annual operation and
maintenance coBts ''and an appropriate share of such fixed
as the Secretary deems proper, due consideration
being giYen to that part of the cost of construction of works
eomwete>d ·with \Vater supply and allocated to irrigation.''
It is obvious under section 9 (e) that the water rate
to be fixed by the Secretary under the Ivanhoe contract is
to include a construction component and that revenue produced in excess of operation and maintenance costs is to
be treated as repayment by the district of its share of construction costs, and it is immaterial that the contract does
not specifically so direct. Any question as to this interpretation of section 9 (e) must now be regarded as settled
by a recent statute providing, among other things, that in
administering sections 9 (d) and 9 (e), the Secretary of the
Interior shall ''credit each year to every party which has
entered into or which shall enter into a long-term contract
pursuant to said subsection (e) so much of the amount paid
by said party on or before the due date as is in excess of
the share of the operation and maintenance costs of the
project which the Secretary finds is properly chargeable to
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that party.
for payments heretofore made under any
such contract shall be established by the
as soon
after the enactment of this Act as it is feasible for him
to do so. After the sum of such credits is equal to the
for
by the
amount which
have been
party if a repayment contract under
(d) had
been entered into, which amount shall be
by the
Secretary upon completion of the project concerned or as
far in advance thereof as is feasible, no construction component shall be included in any
made for the furnishing of water to the contracting party and any charges
theretofore fixed by contract or otherwise shall be reduced
§1
accordingly." (Pub. L. No. 643, 84th Cong., 2d
(July 2, 1956), 70 U.S. Stat. 483-484 ( 1956).)
It has been suggested that the 9
type of contract
places the federal government in the role of a utility, a mere
seller of water, and that district irrigators can never acquire
permanent, appurtenant water rights thereunder. Such reasoning, however, overlooks the clear declaration
has
1902
appeared in the reclamation law since its enactment
that "the
to the use of water acquired under the provisions of this Act .shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated,
'' (32 U.S. Stat. 390, 43 U.S.C.A. §
It iS not
reasonable to suppose that anything in the provisions of
section 9 (e) has in any way altered this basic purpose of
the reclamation law. (Of. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S.
589, 614-615
S.Ct. 1332, 89 Ij.Ed. 1815].) Moreover, it
is now expressly directed that the
of the Interior,
in administering sections 9 (d) and 9 (e), shall provide that
the other party to any contract entered into pursuant to
those sections "shall, during the term of the contract and
of any renewal thereof and subject to fulfillment of all
obligations thereunder, have a first
... to a stated
share or quantity of the project's available water supply
. . . and a permanent right to such share or quantity upon
completion of payment of the amount assigned for ultimate
return by the party, subject to payment of an appropriate
of s-q.ch
if any, as may thereafter be incurred
by the United States in its operation and maintenance of
the project works." The Secretary is expressly authorized
contracts to make their
to amend
9
conform to this act. (Pub. L. No. 643, 84th
1(4), 2
2, 1956), 70 U.S. Stat. 483-484.)
It has also been urged that neither
9 (e) nor the
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I van hoe contract contains a provision authorizing renewal
of the water delivery provisions beyond 40 years and that
the federal government is, therefore, under no obligation to
continue to supply water beyond the 40-year period. The
Department of the Interior has construed the reclamation
law to mean that construction costs allocated to irrigation
may be recovered by means of 9 (e) contracts in any reasonable period within the useful life of the project, and
the rates presently established for the Central Valley Project
are calculated to effect full recovery of the costs of the
major units by the year 2009. There is nothing in section
9 (e) which requires the recovery of all construction costs
within 40 years or which forbids the renewal of water delivery contraets for periods beyond that time. This interpretation must be regarded as settled by the provision recently
added to the reclamation law which authorizes the Secretary,
if requested by the other party thereto, to amend existing
contracts entered into under section 9 (e) to include a provision for renewal. The Secretary is also authorized, upon
request, to amend existing 9 (e) contracts to include a provision contemplating conversion of the 9 (e) contract into
a 9 (d) type repayment contract at a time in the future
when the amount remaining due the United States by the
other party is so small that it can probably be discharged
in annual installments within the period fixed by law for
9 (d) contracts, i.e., at present, 40 years. (Pub. L. No. 643,
84th Gong., 2d Sess. §~ 1 (1), 1(2), 2 (.July 2, 1956), 70 F.S.
Stat. 483-484.)
There is no merit in the argument that the contract is
defective because it fails to state that, upon repayment of
all construction costs, the district shall succeed to whatever
title the United States has acquired to property in the district in connection with the project. The contract provides
that ''Title to all of the Project works, including the distribution system constructed by the United States pursuant
to this contract, shall be and remain in the name of the
United States until otherwise provided for by the Congress,
notwithstanding the transfer hereafter of any such works
to the District for operation and maintenance.'' This provision is required by the reelamation law. ( 32 U.S. Stat.
389, 43 U.S.C.A. § 498.) 'rhere is no reason why the parties
cannot agree that title to the project works shall remain in
the United States after repayment of construction costs.
The provision is a reasonable method of assuring that the
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various properties of the project shall remain devoted to
the purposes for which the federal funds were expended,
and, in the absence of a showing that the provision violates
the Constitution, or a statute or some rule of policy, we
should not hold it to be invalid. There is nothing in the
contract or in the reclamation law which precludes Congress
from transferring title to project property to the district
after all terms of the contract are performed, and it will be
up to the district to press its claim thereto at such a time.
It is not the business of the courts to determine whether
the contract provision is a wise one from the standpoint of
the district; the question is one of validity.
The conclusions expressed above make it unnecessary to
consider whether the Second Validating Act of 1949 (Stats.
1949, p. 1511) is applicable to the contract.
I would reverse the judgment.
Traynor, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The majority opinion is based upon at least two fundamental misconceptions of law. :B'irst, this case does not involve water rights in the ordinary sense. That is, it does not
involve questions relating to the right to divert and use water
from a stream or other source; questions of priority or
riparian ownership or beneficial use of water as defined in
our statutes and court decisions. It involves the validity of
a contract between the government of the United States and
an irrigation district organized and existing under the laws
of this state.
Second, even if the law relating to water rights were involved, the theory enunciated in the majority opinion of title
to all domestic water being held in trust by the state is fundamentally unsound and unsupported in law, tradition, history,
public policy, practice or human experience.
A brief statement relative to the origin and development of
the Central Valley Project and its objectives will demonstrate
that the contract here involved was entered into in accordance
with federal and state law and is therefore valid.
The Central Valley Project was originally authorized by
the State of California for construction by its Water Project
Authority under the Central Valley Project Act of 1933 (Cal.
Stats. 1933, § 1042, p. 2643, effective after referendum action,
.January 13, 1934, now Wat. Code, § 11100 et seq.). No action
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Authorit~· for the construcwa,; taken
tion of this
but on September
1935, President
Roosevelt, by executin: or(ler, transferred $20,000,000 under
the :B'ederal Emergeney Helid Appropriation Act of 1935 to
the Department of the Interior, Reclamation Service, for
eonstruction of Friant Dam on the San Joaquin River. The
projeet was thereafter eonstrueted as a reclamation projeet
to the Heelamation Aet above referred to and acts
amendatory thereto. There is no question but that the United
States government complied with all of the provisions of the
law of California in the acquisition of the water rights incident to this project and that the construction, operation and
maintenance of the storage darns and facilities are in every
respect in accordance with the laws of this state. It is likewise clear that this project was constructed in accordance
with the laws of the United States and that the authority
exercised by the Heelamation Service in storing and distributing the water developed by said project is strictly in accord
with both the laws of the United States and of the State of
California. Such being the case, we must look to these laws
to determine whether or not the state agency involved in this
case had the authority to enter into a contract with the United
States government for the purchase of the water developed by
said project. There is no question but that both the federal
and state laws authorize the execution of such contracts. So
far as our state law is concerned, the contract here involved
is expressly authorized by the Irrigation District Federal
Cooperation Law (Wat. Code, § 23175 et seq.) of this state
which authorizes a state agency to contract with the United
States for a 1vater supply (W at. Code, § 23196a), and to
deliver, distribute, and apportion this supply as required by
federal law (Wat. Code, §§ 23197a, 23200).
The contract here involved is also expressly authorized by
the federal laws relating to the reclamation of arid lands of
the west, and particularly by section 9 (e) of the Reclamation
Project Act of 1939 (33 Stats. 1939, p. 1196, 43 U.S.C.,
§ 485h (e) 1946 F'.R.LA. 600), and section 46 of the Omnibus
Adjustment Act of 1926 ( 46 Stats. of 1926, p. 649, 43 U.S. C.,
§ 423e 1946 F .R.L.A. 318). These laws, in themselves, and
in conjunction with the state laws do not deprive anyone of
property without due process of law, nor deny to anyone equal
protection of the laws, and do not derogate from the powers
reserved to the state under the Tenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.
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There is no
of law in this state which imposes
any restriction against an agency of this state from entering
into a contract with the United States
the subject
matter of the contract here under consideraion. The 160-acre
limitation for the use of water from a reclamation project has
been in existence since 1902 and this
has never been
successfully assailed as impinging any constitutional
of
anyone who has been called upon to
with the provisions of the Reclamation Act.
We are not here concerned with the social and economic
philosophy which was the background of the inclusion of the
160-acre limitation in the Heclamation Act. It is not our
province to declare whether this provision of law is good or
bad. It was adopted
Congress after many years of debate,
and although numerous assaults have been made against it,
Congress has not only refused to delete it from the act but
has on two occasions, once in 1926 and again in 1939, expressly
reaffirmed their belief in the wisdom of this provision. Neither
has the Legislature of California seen fit to disapprove the
inclusion of this provision in the contracts which it has
authorized state agencies to negotiate with the United States
government for the distribution of water from reclamation
projects. The fact that in the case here involved the inhabitants of the district which nrgotiated the contract containing
the 160-acre limitation, voted overwhelmingly in favor of said
contract, should be persuasive evidencr that the provision
is not detrimental to the social and economic welfare of the
people affected by it.
"\Vith respect to the title to the unappropriated waters of
this state, the statutes of this state declare that ''The sovereignty of the State resides in the people thereof . . . . " (Gov.
Code, § 100), and that "All property within the limits of
the State, which does not belong to any person, belongs to
the people" (Gov. Code, § 182). Since the povver of sovereignty is vested in the people, and all property within the
limits of the state, which dors not belong to any person, belongs to the people, it follows that the unappropriated waters
of the state are owned by the people under their power of
sovereignty. The people have, through the Constitution, delegatrd this power to the executive and lrgislative branches of
the government. The Legislature of this state has provided
by law a eomprehensive system for the appropriation, distribution and use of the waters of this state, including the
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impounding and storage of the seasonal run-off for distribution and use for beneficial purposes. I refer to the \Vater
Code of this state adopted by the Legislature in 1943 which
contains the following provisions (among others) with respect
to the ownership, appropriation and use of the domestic
waters of this state:
'' 102. All water within the State is the property of the
people of the State, but the right to the usc of water may be
acquired by appropriation in the manner provided by law.
'' 103. In the enactment of this code the Legislature does
not intend thereby to effect any change in the law relating
to water rights.
"104. It is hereby declared that the people of the State
have a paramount interest in the use of all the water of the
State and that the State shall determine what water of the
State, surface and underground, can be converted to public
use or controlled for public protection.
"105. It is hereby declared that the protection of the
public interest in the development of the water resources of
the State is of vital concern to the people of the State and
that the State shall determine in what way the water of the
State, both surface and underground, should be developed for
the greatest public benefit.
"106. It is hereby declared to be the established policy of
this State that the use of water for domestic purposes is the
highest use of water and that the next highest use is for
irrigation." (W at. Code, §§ 102, 103, 104, 105, and 106.)
In the adoption of the state \Vater Code, the Legislature
has made it abundantly clear that anyone complying with the
laws of this state may be granted a right to appropriate and
use any unappropriated water which he can put to a beneficial use. 'I'he government of the United States, acting under
valid acts of Congress, may beeome an appropriator of any
of the unappropriated waters of this state the same as any
other public or private corporation or individual who complies with the law of this state governing the appropriation
and use of such waters.
After reviewing the history of the water law of California
the majority opinion states: "It is therefore concluded that
the title to the unappropriat(•d waters of the state is in the
State of California in trnst fM thr nse and benefit of the
beneficiaries of that trust; that the trust eharacter of that
title is anchorc<1 in the state by eonstitntional provisions, by
statutes enacted in fnrthcran(:e thereof, an(l by the decisional
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law of the ~tate . . . . '' The majority opinion doe~ not cite
any constitutional or statutory provision or any decision of
any court of this state which supports the foregoing statement.
On the contrary there is not a single constitutional or statutory provision or decision of any court of this state from
which it is possible to draw such couelusion. The words trust
or trustee or trust relationship do not appear in any constitutional or statutory provision or any court decision of this
state dealing with the title or ownership of water by the State
of California.
The reasoning of the majority with respect to the right
of the beneficiaries under the so-called trust to the beneficial
use of water seems incoherent. It proceeds from the premise
'' . . . that the title to the unappropriated domestic waters
of the state is in the State of California in trust for the use
and benefit of the beneficiaries of that trust; ... that the
beneficiaries of that trust are the water users of the state who
in a general sense constit1de all of the people of the state;
that the beneficiaries of the trust relationship whose rights
are here under consideration are those present or prospective
users who individually or in properly classified groups bring
themselves within the orbit of the state law under which they
may be in position to demand benefits without discrimination,
and that within that category are the landowners of the
district.'' (Emphasis added.)
Under the foregoing line of reasoning no vested right may
ever be acquired by any individual or group of individuals to
appropriate and use a given quantity of water for a beneficial
purpose even though they have complied with all the provisions of the statutory law of this state, as the state would
have no power to grant a specific right to any individual
unless every other individual who may have a use for water
has received his share. The following practical example may
demonstrate the absurdity of the reasoning of the majority.
It is a matter of common knowledge that there are vast areas
of land in this state which have no available water supply.
Under existing law, ho·wever, an individual or group of individuals may acquire a right to develop a water supply from
unappropriated waters (see Wat. Code, §§ 1252, 1252.5, 1253,
1350, 1375, 1380, 1390, 1450, 1455) by pumping from wells or
storage of run-off which may be adequate to supply the limited
areas owned by those who develop such supply. However,
there may be other areas in the same locality for which no
water is available because of the prior appropriation and
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available to those who first
with the installation of
and use of the entire available
supply. It is obvious that under the trust theory advanced
in the
opinion, the state could not grant a right to
one user which would
another of his share even
the first
was devoting all of the available
water to a beneficial use on his land. In this connection the
majority opinion states, ''The trust relationship existing
between the state and the beneficiaries of the trust must
therefore be kept in mind in connection with any transactions
between the state or any of its agencies and outside parties.
It follows that when an outside party, such as the United
States, by contract, legislation or otherwise, steps into the
shoes of the state to administer that trust by the development, conservation and distribution of the trust res, it is
bound by the same rules of law as surround and govern the
State of California or any other purveyor of water of the
state for the benefit of its water users. The state may not
therefore lawfully dispossess itself of the title to such water
and may not surrender its control of the same in any way
inconsistent with the administration of the trust under which
the title is held. The state by general law may and has in
the main prescribed the terms and conditions under which
the several classes of water users may become secure in their
r·ight to the water and use thereof." (Emphasis added.)
But the state has not classified water users nor prescribed the
terms and conditions under which they may become secure
in their right to the water and use thereof on any theory of
trust relationship between it and the users. On the other hand
the state has provided that an individual or group of individuals may obtain a permit to appropriate and use a specific
quantity of water, and to the extent that such appropriation
is prior in time, it is prior in right to other appropriations
and constitutes a vested right protected by the due process
clauses of both the state and federal Constitutions. (See \Vat.
Code, §§ 1450, 1455; 'l'emescal Wate1· Co. v. Department of
Public Works, 44 Cal.2d 90 [280 P.2d 1].) In this connection, the Water Code provides (see W at. Code, § 1252.5)
that the government of the United States may acquire a
water right by appropriation in the same manner as any
individual or corporation. The foregoing provisions of the
Water Code are in clear conflict with the so-called trust
theory advanced in the majority opinion. It should be
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perfectly obvious that the provisions of the Water Code
above cited which confer a vested right upon appropriators
of water, including the ·united States, cannot stand in the
face of the holding of the
here that
state holds
the title to all the
of the
as it
state in trust for all of the ·\Yater nsers
of the Water
emmot he denied that the effeet of the
for the apCode which authorize the
of
propriation and use of the unappropriated waters of the
Illstate by indidduals and private anrl publi\'
eluding the United States, is to deprive some of the benefieiaries of the trust of their share of the trust
the first ronw, first served policy with
propriation of the nnappropriated dornestie
state as deelared in the \Vater Codr. rrhe majority opinion
expressly states that "The state may uot t heref:ore lawfully
dispossess itself of the title to sneh water [unappropriated
domestic water] and may not surrender its control of the
same in any way inconsistent with the achninistration of the
trust under which the title is held.'' 'I' he inevitable conclusion which mnst be reached from thr reasoning of the
majority opi11ion is that all unappropriated domestic waters
of the state are held in trnst for the nRe of all of the people
of the state who arc in a position to put their respective shares
of the water to a beneficial use and that sn<:h benefieiaries
have the right to demand and receive their respective shares
of such water as beneficiaries of said trust. In this conn!'etion
the majority states "It is they who are in a position to avail
themselVPs of the right to beneficial use of the waters to he
purveyed and to demand indiscriminate service.''
It must he remembered that there is no provision in either
the state or federal law which purports to allorate auy portion
of the ·water deYeloped by the Central Valley Project to the
plaintiff in this action or to any other agency, group or individual. The allocation and c1istribntion of said water is a
matter to be provided for by eontraet entere(l into pnrsuant
to the provisions of the federal anil state laws on this subject.
After reviewing its trust relationship theory the majority
opinion states "There is nothing- in the foreg-oing declaration
[ trnst relationship between si ate and present or prospective
water users] wJ1ieh intPrjeets anything- new into the water
law of this state. It is hnt a reeognition an1l TPdc<~laration of
("Xisting fnndamrnta1 eoneepts of this
of our law."
If the majority is aware of any prior deelaration of this
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or any other court of this state invoking the trust relationship
concept to state-owned \Yater rights it has failed to disclose
the source or location of such declaration. -While it may not
be new to the majority, it is both new and novel to me and
is basically unsound.
The only authorities upon which the majority rely for
the so-called trust relationship are the following: 211 erchants
Nat. Bank v. Escondido In·. Dist., 144 Cal. 329 [77 P. 937];
Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Collins, 154 Cal. 440 [97 P. 1124] ; Hall
v. Super·ior Court, 198 Cal. 373 [245 P. 814]; Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist. v. Wutchumna W. Co., 111 Cal.App. 688
[296 P. 933] ; L-illen v. Hussey, 101 Cal.App.2d 457 [225
P. 674]. None of these cases even mentions the question of
title or ownership of the unappropriated domestic waters
of the State of California. They deal exclusively with the
rights of landowners within irrigation districts to receive
their respective proportions of the water which the irrigation
district has acquired for the use and benefit of the lands
within the district. It is obvious that in administering the
distribution of water to landowners within an irrigation
district, the district is acting as a trustee and the landowner
a beneficiary, as the landowner supplies the funds which
enable the district to acquire and distribute the water, and
the district should be required to distribute available water
to landowners on a fair and equitable basis so that there
will be no discrimination between them. It is clear that
the landowner within an irrigation district has no property
right in any particular quantity of water, as the title to
the water is vested in the irrigation district which is required
to distribute it to the landowners in accordance with the
latters' needs. The situation with respect to the ownership
of unappropriated domestic water by the state is entirely
different. The state does not undertake to distribute any
particular quantity of water to anyone. It has established
an agency (the Division of Water Resources) to determine
the quantity of water available and to grant permits for the
use of such water to those making application therefor in
accordance with the law. There is no provision of law requiring the Division of vVater Resources to supervise the
distribution of water covered by permits issued by said division, and if the right of the permittee is violated by a third
person, he must resort to the courts for the enforcement of
his right. The Water Code makes it crystal clear that anyone
complying with its provisions may acquire the right to use
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water by appropriation in the manner provided by law.
(See W at. Code, § 102.) The right so aequired is a property
right and protected by the due process clauses of both the
state and federal Constitutions.
The concept of the trust character of title to the domestic
waters of this state being vested in the State of California
as enunciated in the majority opinion is clearly out of
harmony not only with the Constitution and statutes of this
state but with the decisional law as well. This is demonstrated
by the discussion in the majority opinion relative to the
development of the law relating to water rights in this state.
At the beginning of this discussion the majority opinion
refers to the case of Lux v. Haggin decided by this court in
1886 ( 69 Cal. 255). Referring to the holding of this court
in Lux v. Haggin, supra, the majority states: "'fhe doctrine
was declared to be that the owner of real property bordering
such a river or stream had a right co-existent with the same
rights of other landowners on the stream, to the use of its
waters and the flow thereof as it was 'wont to do in the
course of nature' unimpaired in quality and undiminished
in quantity. 'l'his right was declared by this court in Lux
v. Haggin, supra, 69 Cal. 255, to be a right appurtenant to
the land, in fact a part and parcel of the land itself. Under
this doctrine the riparian owner had the right to insist that
the full flow of the stream continue to pass his land in its
natural state whether he needed the water or not. This
riparian right as so defined was declared by this eourt to
be a property right which vested in the riparian owner and
as such was protected by the state and federal Constitutions.
It could not be limited or impaired without due process of
law and without just compensation." It is conceded by
the majority that the rule announced in Lux v. Haggin, supra,
continued to be the rule of decision in this state until 1933
when this court was persuaded by opinions prepared by
the facile pen of Mr. Justice Shenk (see Gin S. Chow v.
City of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673 [22 P.2d 5] ; Peabody
v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal.2d 351 [40 P.2d 486]) to hold that
this doctrine was no longer applicable and was supplanted
by the doctrine of reasonable use even as against appropriators. It should be noted that the theory of the trust
character of title to water rights had not then been conceived by Mr. Justice Shenk as no mention was made of
this theory until now. It would seem, however, that if the
state ever held the title to the domestic waters of this state
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; that
from the
so from the
time the state was admittPd into the union and berame an
entity capable of
ownership and possession of
property. The majority here do not claim that this trust
theory of title to water
originated with the adoption
of the Water Commission Act in 1913 or the adoption of
the amemlment to the Constitution in 1928 (Cal. Const., art.
XIV, § 3) or with the sweeping pronouncements contained
in the decisions of this court in the Gin Chow and Peabody
cases. 'rhis theory must have originated and come into being
when the Constitution of 1849 was adopted and existed at
the time this court decided Lux v. Haggin, supra, in 1886,
and during all of the intervening years when this court
was applying the doctrine announced in Lux v. Haggin. Such
being the case, can it be said that the doctrine of Lux v.
II aggin and all of the other decisions of this court in water
rights cases bet·ween 1886 and the decision of the Gin Chow
ease in 1933 is compatible with the theory that the State
of California held the title to the domestic waters of the
state in trust for water users who are said to be the beneficiaries of the so-called trust. The answer is obvious. The
declaration of the riparian rig-ht doctrine in Lux v. Haggin,
sttpra, is clearly repugnant to any trust concept. Under
this doctrine the riparian owner got title to the riparian
right when a patent was issuerl to him for his riparian land
whether that patent came from the state or federal government. Under this doctrine the right to have the full flow
of the stream past his land unimpaired in quality and
undiminished in quantity except by the reasonable use of
another riparian owner, was a vested right, a part and parcel
of the land itself and protected by the due procPss clauses
of both the state and federal Constitutions. (Miller & Lu,x
v. Madera Ca,nal etc. Co .. 155 Cal. 59 [99 P. 502, 22 I1.R.A.N.S.
391].) While the majority opinion does not purport to
express or declare what was the genesis of the so-called trust
title theory, there are declarations in said opinion from
which an inference might be drawn that the Water Commission Act plus the 1928 constitutional amendment plus
the doctrine announced in the Gin Chow and Peabody cases
gave rise to such theory. After discussing the effect of the
foregoing the majority opinion states: "It is thus apparent
that the more recent changes in the constitutional and decisional law of this state had the effect of making available
for beneficial uses by appropriation and other means great
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waters of
state." I have
volumes of
difficulty attempting to rationalize the
statement.
If the state Her had title to the waters referred to, it never
lost it. If it did not have title to said waters, the title must
have been vested in others. If it was vested in others, the
only manner in which it could acquire title thereto was by
purchase or the exercise of its power of eminent domain
unless the users voluntarily abandoned the waters and made
them available for appropriation and use by others. Certainly, the I,egislature could not by statute nor the people
by the adoption of a constitutional amendment nor could
this court by a valid rule of decision divest an owner of a
valid title to a water right any more than any of those departments of government could validly divest an owner of
private property of his title to lands or personal belongings.
What really happened in this melee of incongruity is that
this court saw fit to change the riparian right doctrine from
that announced in Lux v. Haggin, supra, to the so-called
reasonable use doctrine as announced in the Gin Chow and
Peabody cases by holding that the Dux v. Hagg1:n doctrine
had become outmoded and was not adapted to the arid conditions existing in this state. What this court did in the
said last mentioned decisions had the effect of overruling
all of the former decisions of this court from Lux v. Haggin
in 1886 to Herminghaus v. Southern Calif. Edison Co., 200
Cal. 81 [252 P. 607], decided in 1926, as it is obvious that
said rule could not be changed without overruling said cases
which had held that the riparian right doctrine as announced
in Lux v. H aggin was a vested property right protected by
the due process clauses of both the federal and state Constitutions. What Mr. Justice Shenk did in the Peabody and
Gin Chow cases was simply to ignore the holding of this
court in Miller & L~tx v. Madera Canal rte. Co .. 155 Cal. 59
[99 P. 502], by holding that the doctrine of reasonable use
even as against an appropriator did not violate the due
process clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. I have
heretofore stated that I would have arrived at the same conclusion by forthrightly overruling all of the decisions of
this court applying the Lux v. Haggin doctrine as being unsound in principle and based upon a misapprehension of
the law applicable to water rights (see dissenting opinion
in City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal.2d 908, at
p. 938 [207 P.2d 17]).
47 C.2d-22
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corre(~tly states that the decision
The
of this court in ]JILT v. llaggin ..mpra, was based upon the
declaration contained in seetion 4468 of the Political Code
which provided at that time as follows: "The common law
of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent
with the Constitution of the United States, or the Constitution or laws of the State of California, shall be the rule of
decision in all the courts of this state." But the majority
opinion is in error when it states: ''This court took the
general language of that declaration by its four corners and
applied the English common law doctrine of riparian rights
to the ownership, control and use of the waters of the rivers
and streams of the state.'' 'While it is true that the majority
of this court in its opinion in Lux v. Haggin, supra, assumed
that the riparian right doctrine as there declared was based
upon the common law of England, such assumption was
erroneous and without foundation in fact or law as there
now appears to be no doubt that the riparian right doctrine
was not a part of the common law of England but a part
of the civil law and the first reference to it is contained in
the Code Napoleon, the French Civil Code, in the year 1804.
The first decision announcing the riparian right doctrine
in any common law country was the case of Tyler v. Wilkinson, 4 Mason 397 [F. Cas. No. 14312], which was written by
Mr. Justice Story of the Supreme Court of the United States
while sitting as a circuit judge in the Rhode Island circuit
in the June term of 1827. The first case involving the riparian right doctrine in England was decided in 1849 and
referred to Tyler v. Wilkinson as its authority. My authority
for the foregoing statement is an article written by Mr.
Samuel C. Wiel of the California Bar, an eminent authority
on water law, author of the text "Water Law in the ·western
States" and various other publications on water law. This
article was published in the Harvard Law Review, Volume
XXXIII, Number 2, in 1920.
The fallacy underlying the basis for the decision of this
court in Lttx v. Haggin, sttpra, has permeated numerous
decisions of this conrt and is no doubt the reason for much
of the confusion which has been brought about as the result
of the judicial fumbling and bungling of the water laws of
this state (see dissenting opinion in City of Pasadena v. City
of Alhambra, 33 Cal.2d 908, at 938 [207 P.2d 17]).
Returning to the so-called trust title theory of water rights,
the majority opinion does not purport to delineate the terms
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of the so-called trust. But in view of the position taken by
the majority that the domestic waters, the title to which
is held in trust by the state, must be administered in aceordanee with the statutory and decisional law of the state,
we may assume that such law may be resorted to for the
purpose of ascertaining the terms of the trust. If such is
the case, it would seem that the terms of such trust may be
changed at every session of the Ijegislature or during every
period that a new group of justices constitutes a majority
of the Supreme Court of this state. In other words this
so-called trust character of the title to the domestic waters
of this state, has no stability whatsoever and may be changed
from decade to deeade or from year to year as may be dictated
by the political fortunes of those who declare and administer

it.
The record in this case discloses that in the construction
and operation of the units of the Central Valley Project
the United States through its Bureau of Reclamation has
acquired by purchase and the exercise of the power of eminent domain vast areas of privately owned lands and numerous
water rights some of which were based upon filings of applications for the appropriation of unappropriated waters
by the State of California and various agencies of the state
such as irrigation districts and municipal water districts
and also from many private individuals and corporations
which claimed to own vested rights in the domestic waters
of this state both as appropriators and riparian owners.
Included among the agencies from which such rights were
acquired by the United States are Madera Irrigation District,
Tranquility Irrigation District, J amrs Irrigation District,
and the following private or quasi-public corporations: Miller
and Lux, Inc., Gravelly Ford Canal Company, Kings River
Canal and Irrigation Company, Columbia Canal Company,
San Ijuis Canal Company, Firebaugh Canal Company, Gerlach Live Stock Company, Hollister Land and Canal Company, Chowchilla Farms, Inc., Edison Securities Company
and many other corporations and individuals. '\Vhile the
consideration paid by the United. States for the rights acquired from the above public agencirs, corporations and
individuals is not disclosed, it appears, that the sum of
$2,450,000 was paid to Miller anrl T1nx. Ine .. for title to all
of the waters of the San ,Joaquin Rivrr in rxeess of flows
specified in schedules attached to the agreempnt of purchase
(see Report Prepared Pursuant to Senate Concurrent Reso-

676

IvANHOE IRR. DrsT.

v.

ALL PARTIES

[47 C.2d

lution Number 48, Legislature of 1951, introduced in evidence
's Exhibit N.)
as Water Project
If the majority is right in holding that the title in all of
the water rights acquired by the United States in connection
with the construction, development and operation of the
Central Valley Project is held in trust for the water users
of this state, such holding must be based upon the premise
that all of
so
were held in trust by the
owners of such rights who conveyed the same to the United
States. This would apply to the vast riparian right holdings
of Miller and Lux, Inc., whieh were adjudicated by numerous
decisions of this court as being a part and parcel of the
lands of said corporation, title to which was vouchsafed
by the due process clauses of both the federal and state Constitutions.
vVhile there can be no question that the Supreme Court of
the United States has held in many eases that the matter of
ownership, distribution and use of water, with few limited
exreptions, is -.,yithin the jurisdietion of the state and the
d('termination of the right to appropriate and use water is
controlled by state law (Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 93-94
127 S.Ct. 655, 51 IJ.Ed. 956] ; Unitecl States v. Arizona, 295
U.S. 174 155 S.Ct. 666, 79 L.Ed. 1371]; Unitecl States v.
Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 [70 S.Ct. 955, 94 IJ.Ed.
1231]), rerent deeisions of that court make it clear that there
are certain fields in which the federal law prevails over the
state and that the state's control of the waters within the
state is not complete and unqualified (see United States v.
San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 [60 S.Ct. 749, 84 hEd. 1050] ;
First Iowa Hyclro-Electn'c Coop. v. Federal Powm· Corn., 328
U.S. 152 [66 S.Ct. 906, 90 L.Ed. 1143] ; Henry Ford & Son
v. Little Falls Fibre Co., 280 U.S. 369 [50 S.Ct. 140, 74 L.Ed.
483]; Federal Power Com. v. Niagara JJ1ohawk Power Corp.,
347 1J.S. 239 [74 S.Ct. 487, 98 hEd. 666]; Federal Power
Corn. v. State of On;gon, 349 U.S. 435 f75 S.Ct. 832, 99 hEd.
1215]; State of Wash. Drpt.
Garne v. Federal Power Corn.,
207 1<'.2(1 891; Alabama Powf'r Co. v. (htlf Power Co., 283 F.
606; California Orcrton Pou'e1· Co. v. Snpe1·ior Court, 45 Cal.2d
858 [291 P.2d 4fi5l ). Tt seems elrar,
that in the
of the units of the Central Valley
Projeet thP
StaJpq
under the provi:sions
of the n('(·lmnai ion Ad
U.S. C.,§ 7::!1
Req.) aud with full
reeognition of th(' waiPI" rights there involved having valid
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( UJiilul /:)fates . Ucl'lach Live !:)lock
94 L.Ed. 1281]).
It is a matter of tommon
that there are thousands, probably mill ions of acres of land in California which
are still in
ownership and vast water resources
exist in these regions. As I read the recent decisions of the
Supreme Court or the llnited
I have little doubt that
under the rnle:s o[ law mmoum~ed
the federal government rnay
exereise exdusive eontrol over the water
resourees whid1 exist ou lauds and in areas owned and controlled by it. l refer to the national forests aud the undeveloped area:-; of thi:,; state whieh remain almost exdusively in
government ownership and eontrol.
\V e may take judicial uotiee that the federal government
is now engaged in the eoustruetion of another large reelamation project which will be anuexed to and contribute to the
water resourc~es of the Central Valley Projed. I refer to the
'rrinity River Project which eontemplates the eonstruction
of a dam 46[) feet high on the Trinity River near \Veaverville
in 'rrinity County, \vhieh will impound the run-off of the
Trinity l~iver watershed and will ha\·e a eapaeity of approximately 2,500,000 acre feet of storage. More than 75 per cent
of the 450,000 aeres of land embraced within this project is
owned by the United States government. \Vhen this dam is
eompleted and the water therefrom discharged into the Saeramento !liver basin, the t'nitcd States government will no
doubt proceed to di:,;pose of it in aeeordanee with the laws of
the United States including the 160-aere limitation in the
Reclamation Aet. It does not seem reasonable and logical
to me that this court should say to the government of the
United States that you eannot impound the waters of the
'rrinity River basin which are now running to waste and
causing innm~asurahle flood damage, and divert it into areas
where it may be used for the inigation and improvement of
arid lands and other useful purposes unless you eliminate
from your eontracts for the distribution of this water the
160-acre limitation whieh the Congress of the United States
has said must be included in sueh eontraets. Yet, this requirement must flow from the holding of the majority here even
though the water mai!e available by said project is produced
from a drainage basin, 75 per cent of the area of which is
owned by the United States.
It is my view that when the United States eonstructs a
reclamation project by impounding water in compliance with
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both statn and federallawc-:, it is the owner of that water and
may dispose of it as provided h~r federal law, and it may exact
any condition ·whi(·h the federal law sees fit to provide for in
conneetion with the sale and distribution of that water. Of
eourse this does not mean that Congress eonld impose restrictions in eonfliet with constitutional prineiples. It may be
that the State of Califomia by l<>gislativc aetion could so
restrid the appropriation of its water resourees that the federal government ·would not see fit to develop further reclamation projects in this state, but so long as the federal government complies 1dth the law of the State of California in the
eonsteuetion, operation and maintenance of its reclamation
projeets, 1 am dispos(:<l to hold that it may sell and distribute
the water developed by said projects under eontraets of the
type here invotn:d whieh, in my opinion, do not violate any
provision of the Constitution and laws of this state or the
Constitution and laws of the United States.
We have here no eontroversy between the State of California and the United States. The attorney gew;ral of California takes the position that the eontraets here involved are
valid. 'fhc agencies here involved have all aecepted and
approved these eontraets both by their governing boards and
the inhabitants of the districts affected thereby. '!.'he validity
of these contracts is ehallengecl only by individuals who claim
that their property rights will be affected thereby. I do not
agree .
.At the outset of this opinion I stated that the majority
opinion is based upon two fundamental misconceptions. I then
called attention to the fact that the majority opinion is written upon the assumption that this is a case involving water
rights and that the State of California holds title to all of the
domestic waters of the state in trust. 1 think it proper to
add another fundamental misconception on which the majority
opinion is based; that is, that the so-called lGO-acrc limitation
is in effcet an excess land law. \Vith this concept I do not
agree. In an excellent artide by Professor Paul S. Taylor,
Professor of J<Jconomics, UniYersity of California, printed in
the Yale Law Journal, Volume 64, Kmnber 4, February, 1955,
entitled "The E:r.ccss Land Law: Execution of a Public
Policy," he states in part:
''.A great confusion pervades discussion of the excess land
law and threatens disaster to public policy regarding disposing of public domain. Congress has declared this policy
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to be the widespread diRtribution of benefits, and the curbing
of monopoly and speculation, whether the domain is in form
of land, water, or both. The exceRs land provision of the
National Reclamation Act of 1902 is a means of attaining
these ends in the public disposal of water.
''General and legal aeeeptance have joined to eonfer authority upon eitlwr of two deseriptivo titles--' excess laud law'
or '160-aere limitation '-both of them equally deeeptiYE'. The
law is not really a land law, and it places no limitation whatsoever upon the acreage a man may O\Yn. The restraint is
neither upon acreage of land nor upon water, but upon the
individual. No individual is entitled to receive more than an
equitable share of the water distributed under reclamation
law. The maximum individual share is set at an amount of
water necessary to irrigate 160 acres of land.
''Among the sourees of this confusion of language, two are
'accidents '-one physical, the other historical. The first is
the unequal geographical distribution of water. \Vater and
land are two halves of a productive whole everywhere. East
of the one hundredth meridian nature has joined them, and
any description or analysis of agricultural land can assume
water. \Vest of the hundredth meriflian water and land are
separate. Man-made works-reservoirs and canals-are required to join thrm. vVater and land, therefore, must be
treated separately, whether as physical entities, objects of
private ownership, or the concern of public policy. \Vater
cannot be assumed as the natural, inevitable and permanent
adjunct of land.. Land ownership does not cqnal water owner·
ship west of the hunnrE'dth meridian.
''The second source of confusion is an historical accident.
Policy was debated and formulated in the nineteenth century
when settlement was still east of the hundredth meridian,
and water was not a concern. The great legislative landmarks in the nation's policy favoring actual settlers are land
laws-the Pre-emption Act of 1841 and the Homestead Act
of 1862. After these acts were passE'd, settlement crossed
the hundredth meridian, and water berame the primary concern. General policy was not altered with the movement
to the arid belt, but the techniques and devices for implementing it had to change. The artificial nnion of land and
water required more eomplcx thonght and language than was
necessary where land and ·water are joined naturally. The
means of applying pnblie poliey to water had to be de-
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clared separately, spelled out in new terms. Chief among
the new techniques \Yas the excess land law.
"It took something of a mental wrench to turn American
lawmakers and administrators from land policy to water
policy. The natural tendency was to cany over the language
of earlier land problems to the more complex problems of
water. A result of this inertia has been confusion in thought
as well as in language west of the hundredth meridian, where
thinking in terms of land policy overemphasizes land and
underemphasizes water. Some persons have found it advantageous to exploit the confusion. Those who achieved what
Major Powell called 'monopoly of land' utilize this habit of
thinking in terms of land policy to confuse the public, to
suggest that private landowners have a moral claim to water
in proportion to their landholdings whatever their size, and
to defeat the efforts of legislators who seek equitable distribution of water among individuals. Even administrators do not
find it easy to remember that the essential question is not,
who owns the land, but who gets the water.
"The fact of importance above all others in federal reclamation is that the landowner calls upon the government to
provide him with water. It is for Congress representing the
general interest, and not for the landowner, to say upon
what terms, in what amount, and in accord with what policy
the public will supply water. This is a first principle inherent in a relationship between the public that gives and
an individual who receives. The concern of the law is to
distribute water equitably among individual landowners, not
-except below 160 acres-in proportion to their holdings of
land. This principle is accepted without question by most
landholders seeking water under reclamation law; the few
who object usually are holders of excess land.''
I am in full accord with the views expressed by Professor
Taylor and commend the reading of his article in full by
those who are interested in this subject.
Since the majority opinion is based upon the wholly unsound and unsupported assumption that the title to the water
rights acquired by the United States in the construction,
development and operation of the Central Valley Project
are held in trust for the use and benefit of the water users
of California anrl that the title to such rights is therefore
restricted to the extent that the United States may not dispose of such water pursuant to the Reclamation Act of 1902
and acts amendatory thereto containing the so-called 160-
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aere limitation, it follows that the conclusion reached by the
majority that the contract here iu,-olved deprives certain
landowners within the plaintiff irrigation district of vested
rights without due process of law and without just compensation is equally unsound and unsupported.
For the reasons hereinabove stated I would reverse the
judgment.
'l'he petition of defendant and appellant for a rehearing
1ras denied February 19, 1957. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and
'l'raynor, .J., were of the opinion that the petition should be
granted.
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MADERA IRRIGATIO~ DISTRICT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ALL PEHSONS, etc., Defendants; JOHN
HUMPHREYS et al., Hespondents; 'l'IIE PEOPLE
et al., Defendants and Appellants.
[1] Waters-Irrigation Districts-Contracts: Property and Water
Rights.-A contract between an irrig-ation district and the
United States by which the United States undertook to deliver
water for irrigation purposes from the Central Valley Project
to the district and to expend funds for the construction of a
distribution system within the district is ineffectiYe where it
deprives landowners of the distriet of yested rights as members
of the class who are beneficiaries of the trust under whieh the
United States acquired appropriatiYe rights to domestic waters
of the state, deprives "larg-e landowners" of rights to waters
for their lands in excess of 160 acres, grants the United
States the right to distribute water for irrigation at a price
without eompliance with laws of the state relating to distribution of its domestic water, reserves to the United States the
right to determine at its own discretion whether to continue
distribution of water to the distriet and landowners after
termination of the contract, and fails or refuses to recognize
the debtor-creditor relationship of the parties for repayment
of costs of construction.
[1] See Cal.Jur., W att>rs, § 631, 638 et seq.; Am.Jur., Irrigation,
§ 83 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Waters, §§529, .538; [2] Waters,
§§164, 167; [3, 4, 6] Waters, §171; [5, 7] Waters, §176; [8-10]
Waters, § 538.

